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Abstract 
The foreign exchange cash-flow of Uganda has reached a crisis. Expenditure 
requiring foreign exchange is on the increase as the economy grows, while 
foreign exchange receipts have dwindled over the past four years from about 
US$400 million to a cashflow position of about US$100 million. 
This study investigates the constraints which prevent exports receipts 
from increasing in response to the exchange rate reforms since 1981. 
The first conclusion drawn from this study is that exchange rate policies, 
unless pursued within a consistent macroeconomic stabilization framework, 
cannot enlist a significant response from exports producers. 
Second, it is clear that other constraints encompassing institutional 
reforms and infrastructural reconstruction must also be addressed before a 
country can develop dynamic comparative advantage. 
I Statement of the problem 
Introduction: the problem 
Whereas in the 1960s Uganda's export base was diversified, since the early 
1970s the sources of export earnings have been narrowing and are now almost 
exclusively coming from coffee, which by 1989 accounted for 97% of the total 
value of export receipts. 
The danger of this narrow export base has been demonstrated dramatically 
over the past three years. When the International Coffee Organisation (ICO) 
quota collapsed, and the international price of coffee declined from US$3.3 per 
kg in 1986 to US$0.98 per kg. in 1990, Uganda's foreign exchange earnings 
dropped from the all-time high of US$394 million in 1986 to US$179 in 1990, 
a decline of 54% in four years. 
Although the possibility of short-run price increases cannot be ruled out, the 
long-term prospects of rising international coffee prices are poor, given world 
wide over production and existing stocks. Therefore, the downward trend in 
Uganda's earnings is likely to continue as long as coffee dominates the export 
base. 
The demand for imports, to reconstruct the productive structure of the 
economy and to provide essential consumer goods, has risen from US$438 
million in 1986 to US$740 million in 1990, an increase of 68% in four years. 
The imports financed by loans and grants totalled US$228 million in 1987 or 
36% and US$333 million in 1988 or 53% of the total value of imports. The 
figures for 1989 are US$494 million or 69%. 
This indicates a dangerous trend emerging, of an import-intensive economy 
whose exports earnings are continuously declining. If the country had to pay 
all due external debt obligations, i.e., all maturities without rescheduling debt 
from bilateral donors under the Paris Club Agreement, the debt service ratio 
in 1990 stands at 106% of total exports earnings, leaving nothing to meet 
import requirements. 
In the financial year 1990/91, Uganda could not pay monthly oil imports 
bill which averaged around US$10 million since foreign exchange earnings had 
dropped to an average of US$9 million a month. This situation was aggravated 
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by the Gulf crisis, which more than doubled the international prices of 
petroleum products. The case for export development and diversification away 
from exclusive dependence on coffee is well illustrated by the above statistics 
and cannot be overstated: this is the problem to which economic policy must 
find an immediate answer. 
Constraints to export development and diversification 
The deterioration of Uganda's export base occurred during the 1970s. Policies 
since 1981 to diversify the export base have not produced visible difference 
in the export statistics. The projected contribution of non-traditional exports to 
foreign exchange receipts has been estimated at around US$100 million by the 
Ministry of Planning and Economic Development. The Government, aware of 
the gravity of the problem, has pursued very liberal policies for the past three 
years to promote exports diversification. To date, however, the response 
indicates that foreign exchange receipts from non-traditional exports have been 
far below the projected Export Promotion and Development Unit (EPADU) 
figure of US$100 million per annum, increasing only from US$1.06 million 
in 1987 to US$22.64 million in 1989. This suggests that there are serious 
constraints to export development and diversification which need to be 
investigated with care. 
Objectives of the study 
The first objective of this study is to identify existing and prospective non-
traditional exports with good potential in the international and regional 
markets, and to study how rapid expansion of these exports is being affected 
by current policies, with a view to suggesting changes tailored to broad 
categories of commodities and sources. 
The second objective is to identify the constraints to export development 
and diversification in some detail, and, where possible, to rank them in order 
of relative importance which points clearly to specific problems for first policy 
attack. 
The third objective is to review current policies to explain why they have 
been unable to make a difference in export performance and to identify those 
policies which need overhauling to bring about a rapid change in the export 
base and earnings in the near future. The fourth objective is to suggest policy 
recommendations. 
THE DEVELOPMENT OF NON-TRADITIONAL EXPORTS IN UGANDA 
Scope of the study 
3 
The general thrust of this paper is on constraints to export development and 
diversification. References to specific exports are reserved for illustrative 
purposes only, as specific constraints need case studies. 
Outline of the study 
The paper is divided into seven sections. After this introduction, there follows 
a review of the macro-economic framework of the 1970s that led to the 
deterioration of the export base. The third section is a survey of the literature 
on export development and diversification, while the fourth sets out a 
methodology to study export development and diversification in the light of 
Uganda's data problems. The fifth section identifies exports for immediate 
development and diversification, while the sixth is a review of the policies of 
the 1980s and their effects on the constraints to export development and 
diversification. This includes comparisons of Tanzania and Kenya, countries 
with similar development problems but competing more successfully against 
Uganda in the international and regional preferential trade area (PTA) markets. 
The final section ranks the constraints that policies have been unable to 
ameliorate, and suggests policy changes. 
Important terminologies 
'Traditional exports' are those raw materials which constituted the export 
structure of the colonial period: coffee, cotton, tea, tobacco, sugar and copper 
(GOPA Consultants, 1984). 
'Non-traditional exports' are all other commodities which sprung up since 
1962; agricultural raw materials, processed food stuffs and manufactures. 
'Export diversification' refers to changing the composition of exports, i.e., 
the relative contribution of each export category to total export earnings, with 
a view to establishing a wider variety of exports with good market prospects 
abroad and not subjected to identical swings in international prices. Therefore, 
it is not diversification per se but changing the composition of exports with a 
purpose of increasing foreign exchange earnings (IMF, 1987). 
'Export development' is a wider term covering: laying the physical 
infrastructure and formulating an institutional framework for export promotion, 
including establishing the data base, searching and developing export markets; 
solving the technological problems to increase exports production by providing 
4 RESEARCH PAPER 28 
inputs and training, and giving adequate economic incentives to export 
producers (Bennet, 1989), and improving the macroeconomic framework to 
provide a favourable climate for exports and economic growth generally. 
II From export diversification to 
concentration 
With the exception of the Industrial Sector Memo of 1986, the literature 
covering the 1970s and 1980s is general in its analysis. It focuses on the 
macroeconomic, as opposed to microeconomic, policies pursued by Amin's 
military regime 1972-79 which disrupted the economy from its growth path of 
the early and mid-1960s. 
This section departs from this approach in two respects: first, it is narrow 
in scope and focused on the export sector. Second, it presents an overall 
perspective both macro and micro, of the disruptive policies that were pursued 
by the military regime, as well as the development opportunities that were 
missed, to maintain and expand Uganda's diversified export base, inherited 
irom the post-independence era. 
An overall perspective is necessary initially to appreciate the constraints 
facing the export sector today, and to make pertinent recommendations. 
The period up to 1972 
Uganda's export base from independence in 1962 until 1972, diversified. The 
'traditional exports', consisting of agricultural raw materials had been 
encouraged by colonial policy to raise tax revenue. They consisted of coffee, 
cotton, tea and tobacco, in order of relative importance. Copper, the only 
mineral mined is economic quantities, was also exported unprocessed and 
contributed up to 10% of total export receipts. Table 1 shows the 'traditional 
raw materials exports' to Europe inherited from the colonial trade pattern. 
It is important to investigate how the economy adjusted to colonial policies 
in order to identify which production and demand factors explained the 
apparent success of the traditional exports. Post-independence policies would 
have had to take these factors into account (without necessarily continuing 
colonial policy) in order to develop the export sector. 
Table 1 Composition of exports 1968-89, (f.o.b., US$ million) 
Commodity 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 
Coffee 102.1 111.4 144.9 140.3 161.2 215.5 338.7 241.7 340.0 339.7 359.0 355.0 397.3 311.1 260.3 151.7 141.6 
Cotton 42.2 35.9 50.1 50.3 52.6 48.0 4.3 2.2 3.3 11.6 12.4 15.4 5.1 4.1 3.1 0.2 5.7 
Copper 15.9 25.6 23.6 19.7 16.1 15.6 - - - - - - - - - - -
Tea 10.6 13.3 13.5 13.6 18.0 1.5 0.3 0.3 0.8 1.2 3.2 1.1 3.2 1.9 1.2 0.4 3.5 
Animal feeds 5.4 6.0 6.9 4 9 4.4 6.4 - - - - - - - - - - -
Hides and skins 2.9 3.8 3.8 3.0 6.5 4.5 - - - 3.2 4.5 - - - - - -
Sugar 0.3 2.5 0.6 - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Unmanufactured 
tobacco 0.4 2.4 1.1 1.9 - 1.7 0.3 - - 0.9 1.5 0.3 - - 0.6 - 2.1 
Maize and beans - - - - 0.9 - - - 0.6 11.3 10.1 3.1 1.1 - 0.3 - -
Other exports - - - - - - 2.2 2.5 0.7 2.1 6.6 4.3 4.7 3.1 2.9 4.9 -
Barter trade 
(of which 70% 
is coffee) 49.3 94.4 
Total 179.3 200.9 244.5 233.7 259.7 293.2 345.8 246.6 346.4 370.0 397.3 379.3 411.4 320.2 322.3 251.6 178.7 
Coffee as % 56.8 55.4 59.3 60.0 62.1 73.5 97.8 97.9 98.2 91.8 90.4 93.6 96.6 97.1 92.1 97.8 69.8 
of total 
Note: The table is divided into three sections according to the major factors that influence the changes in the composition of exports, 
corresponding to year 1973, 1981 and 1986. 
Source: Bank of Uganda Quarterly Economic Report. Figures for 1974-80 are not available in US$. 
THE DEVELOPMENT OF NON-TRADITIONAL EXPORTS IN UGANDA 
The comparative advantage in producing the new cash crops of coffee and 
cotton depended on suitable weather and good soil, which was to be exploited 
by a simple peasant technology. In this respect, Uganda was similar to other 
colonies where: 
... [when] a new cash crop is introduced, the essence of its success as 
a peasant crop depends on the fact that it does not represent a radical 
departure from the existing techniques of production (Myint 1971, p. 
78) 
Specialization in production depended on nature and traditional technology, 
with little any new investment, except in infrastructure, to carry the output to 
the processing and export centre. Mining at Kilembe, however, used advanced 
technology, but depended on capital inflow from Canada plus skilled and semi-
skilled labour from the Asian community which came to Uganda under the 
protection of the colonial umbrella (Republic of Uganda, 1973 and 1981; Bank 
of Uganda, 1970 and 1974). 
On the demand side, favourable international commodity prices following 
the Korean war, and the stockpiling of raw materials motivated by the cold 
war, provided an excellent international market for coffee, cotton and copper. 
The large savings from the all time high world prices of raw materials were 
put into the Price Assistance Fund set up by the Marketing Boards, and were 
used to construct infrastructure, for example the Owen Falls Dam at Jinja 
(Glentworth and Wozei, 1972). The existence of electricity stimulated 
agricultural processing industries which added value to the primary exports; for 
example, Uganda started processing tea, cotton seed cake, and refined sugar. 
Further, capital inflow from the Asian community added to the financing of 
essential inputs and working capital needed to run the newly created 
processing capacity (Nsereko, 1988). 
The existence of the East African Common market from 1948-74, added to 
Uganda's export opportunities by allowing a specialization of a larger variety 
of primary agricultural exports, processed foodstuffs and manufactured goods. 
Tables 2 and 3 show this greater variety of exports to Kenya and Tanzania 
during the later 1960s. The overall picture is summarized in Table 4, which 
shows a diversified export base and the relative contribution of each category 
of commodity to total export receipts, by destination. 
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Table 2 Uganda: principle commodities exported to Kenya, 1968-70 
(Ug. Shs 000s) 
Commodity category 1968 1969 1970 
1. Agriculture r a w materials 
Fish-fresh (simply prepared) 1,926 2,704 1,743 
Cereals (unmilled) 1,061 957 1,153 
Peas, beans and lentils 1,030 500 2,027 
Sugar unrefined 26,041 15,348 14,494 
Tobacco unmanufacturerd 12,801 2,771 11,305 
Oil seeds, nut and kanals 2,962 3,390 5,636 
Manufactured goods, food processing 
Tea 1,150 469 397 
Meat and meat preparations 71 55 658 
Buscuits 1,374 828 78 
Confectionery 2,560 2,312 3,504 
Feeding stuff (animal) 1,803 2,053 1,804 
Margerine and shortening 13,842 8,550 13,772 
Cotton seed oil 13,168 9,583 14,751 
Beer 663 304 3,260 
Other manufactured goods 
Cigarettes 21 - 8 
Electricity 9,953 8,472 9,318 
Soaps 3,410 3,869 2,101 
Fertilizers 3,777 6,313 7,814 
Cotton fabric 35,171 42,887 54,495 
Bars and rods of iron/steel 7,121 10,832 10,567 
Enamelled hollow ware 884 861 1,567 
All other commodities 2,209 33,196 41,005 
Total 142,998 156,054 201,454 
Source: Bank of Uganda, Annual Report 1970-71, p. 84. 
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Table 3 Uganda: principle commodities exported to Tanzania, 1968-70 
(Ug.Shs 000s) 
Commodity category 1968 1969 1970 
1. Agriculture raw materials 
Cereals (unmilled) 189 874 2,231 
Bananas, beans and lentils 536 484 2,121 
Tobacco unmanufactured 7 - 57 
2. Manufactured goods, food processing 
Biscuits 58 31 35 
Confectionery 311 305 534 
Msrgarine and shortening 911 89 101 
Cotton seed oil 3,992 8,481 9,448 
3. Other manufactured goods 
Cigarettes 19 - 1 
Soaps 104 26 6 
Fertilizers 154 31 109 
Bicycle tyres and tubes 2,107 2,465 2,169 
Cotton fabrics 10,060 2,818 1,414 
Building materials and asbestos 1,185 1,200 1,989 
Bars and rods of iron/steel 5,837 6,870 6,916 
Enamelled hollow ware 470 313 359 
Footwear 969 256 941 
Matches 1,074 147 
All other commodities 12,447 9,919 11,464 
Total 40,579 34,265 39,895 
Source: Bank of Uganda, Annua/ Report 1970-71, Consolidated Printers, p. 84. 
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Table 4 Uganda's diversified export base: the relative 
contribution of each category of commodity to total 
export receipts, and by destination, 1970 (%) 
Commodity category and destination Percentage contribution 
Primary exports to Europe 
1. Copper, tea tobacco 13 
2. Coffee 51 
3. Cotton 16 
4. Regional exports to Kenya and Tanzania 20 
Total 100 
Source: Calculated from East African Community, 1972. 
To maintain the diversified export base shown in Table 4, or to even widen it, 
required a number of development policies for example: 
1. Peasant agriculture needed new inputs of technology and extension services 
to reduce dependency on weather and to stave off diminishing returns from 
declining soil fertility and over-cropping; 
2. An increasing variety of new agricultural commodities had to be developed 
to take advantage of the changing composition of demand on the 
international market as the post-Korean war boom in the traditional primary 
commodities receded; 
3. Capital inflow and domestic savings needed to be encouraged to finance 
and expand processing capacity, as well as to maintain the newly built 
infrastructure, as the Price Assistance Fund became depleted; 
4. Commercial policies were needed to expand the regional market, since this 
market provided opportunities for a large variety of exports, both primary 
and processed; and 
5. Investment was required in appropriate skills by providing education, 
training and incentives to encourage new entrants into the export sector. 
Economic policies that eroded the structure of the export base 
From 1969 and throughout the 1970s, a number of policies were adopted 
which disrupted the economic trends of the 1970s. Since these policies have 
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been extensively reviewed elsewhere, this sub-section will focus only on those 
aspects that specifically led to the shrinkage of the export base (see footnote 
1). 
Expulsion of the Asian community 
In 1972, the Government launched an 'economic war' during which it expelled 
60,000 mostly Asian non-nationals at short notice without developing an 
alternative skills base to manage the affected businesses. The effect of this 
expulsion on the export sector was fundamental and affected processing 
capacity, confidence and crop finance. 
Processing capacity The Asians were processing a wide variety of 
agricultural raw materials and light manufactures both for local consumption 
and for export. In the period that followed the expulsion, the processing and 
manufacturing facilities were either taken over by the government and turned 
into parastatals, or were arbitrarily allocated to new owners without training 
and skills. In addition, the allocations changed hands frequently leading to 
ownership disputes that curtailed investment. 
The effect was a wide ranging mismanagement of processing capacity, the 
consumption of capital, in terms of over utilization of plant and equipment, 
and the lack of repair, or maintenance of spare parts. By 1980, processing and 
manufacturing capacity was either dilapidated, obsolete or needed complete 
replacement. 
Although lack of data prevents an empirical illustration of the direct link 
between the deterioration of processing capacity and the shrinkage of the 
export base, Tables 5-6 provide some idea of the magnitude of this problem. 
Table 5 shows that the number of firms processing export declined due to lack 
of experience and essential inputs. Table 6 shows that actual,production of 
some exportables and capacity utilization of the relevant plant and equipment 
declined. 
Erosion of confidence The expulsion of the Asians without compensation, 
the subsequent arbitrary allocation of business, coupled with general insecurity, 
had another collective effect — the loss of confidence by private investors, 
both local and foreign, in any long-term investment in Uganda. This lack of 
confidence has made it extremely difficult to attract new investment to rebuild 
processing and manufacturing capacity. For example, it is not possible to re-
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Table 5 Firms processing selected exportables, 1969, 1971, 
1983 
Exportable Number of firms 
1969 1971 1983 
Coffee curing 148 162 122 
Cotton ginning 52 52 24 
Tea 29 32 26 
Tanneries and shoes 10 9 6 
Tyres and plastics 9 8 3 
Note: firms employing ten or more persons only. 
Source: IBRD, Uganda Industrial Sector Memo, 1986, p. 96. 
Table 6 Production and capacity utilization of plants producing 
selected exportables, 1971, 1981 
Exportable Production in metric Capacity 
tonnes 000s utilization (%) 
1971 1981 1981 
Sugar 141.0 6.6 2.8 
Animal feed 24.6 3.5 19.1 
Cigarettes 1,581.0 231.0 12.8 
Cotton fabrics 46,178.0 21,893.0 42.8 
Bicycle tyres 418.0 14.0 1.4 
Small matches 55.0 2.1 4.9 
Source: IBRD, Uganda Industrial Sector memo, 1986, p. 102. 
open the Kilembe mines which were closed in 1978. The country is unable to 
work out an ownership structure which investors can trust to mobilize the 
large-scale financing required (Republic of Uganda, 1989, p. 87). This means 
copper, as shown in Table 1, is continually depressed. 
In a survey of 84 processing and manufacturing enterprises in 1984, it was 
found that: 
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Throughout the sector, the shortage of working capital is perceived by 
the enterprises as the most critical problem facing manufacturing 
industry in Uganda, whether it is expressed in terms of shortages of 
spare parts and equipment, of foreign exchange and imported inputs, 
or of locally available materials (Republic of Uganda, 1986, p. 56). 
Table 7 expresses how this problem affected particular industries. 
Table 7 Reasons for low capacity utilization, 1986 
Product groups Reasons for low capacity 
Textiles d,e,f 
Food d,e,g 
Beverages and tobacco b,e,d 
metal products b,e,d 
Non-metallic mineral products b,e,d 
Chemicals b,e,d 
Paper and stationery a,e,d 
Leather shoes b,e,c 
Reasons: Occurance 
a = Low market demand = 1 
b = Shortage of imported materials = 5 
c = Shortage of local materials = 1 
d = Equipment breakdown = 5 
e = Lack of spare parts = 8 
f = Inadequate facilities = 1 
g = Employment problems = 1 
Source: Survey conducted by the Ministry of Industry and 
Technology, IBRD, Uganda Industrial Sector Memo, 30 
September 1983, p. 56. 
Although in theory the state could provide the financing from budgetary 
allocations, and from project aid and technical assistance, this type of financing 
is in short-supply.2 In any event, it is qualitatively not a perfect substitute for 
private capital which comes with the 'know-now' and the commitment to make 
the enterprises run successfully. Therefore, the restoration of the confidence 
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necessary to mobilize financing for export development and diversification, is 
a big problem, which we shall return to later on. 
Crop finance The bulk of agriculture exports — coffee, cotton, plus tea and 
tobacco from outgrowers — were produced by small peasant farmers on plots 
between one and five hectares. These crops used to be purchased on a cash 
basis by Asian traders, and processed for export either directly, in the case of 
tea and tobacco, or through the Marketing Boards, in the case of cotton and 
coffee. 
When the Asians were expelled, no new institution stepped in to provide 
crop finance. The state, through the co-operative system, bought the crops, but 
paid farmers late, up to one year in some cases. Consequently, the farmers 
reallocated their resources away from annual crops, like cotton, to food crops 
which earned cash on delivery to the market. For these crops, like coffee, there 
was no incentive to improve production technology for higher yields, thus 
reducing export volumes. 
The disintegration of the East African Community 
Political disputes as to whether Amin's military ascendancy was legitimate, 
and economic disputes over the distribution of benefits between the member 
states, led to the collapse of the East African Community in 1974. Uganda's 
products were then faced with commercial restrictions in the Kenyan and 
Tanzanian markets. This affected manufactured goods, food processing and 
other manufactured goods (see sections 2 and 3 in Tables 2 and 3). 
The East African Railways and Harbours were jointly run by the East 
African Community. After 1974, Uganda was required to pre-pay cash in 
foreign exchange using either the harbours or the Kenyan Railway. This meant 
the flow of goods was disrupted whenever the country faced foreign exchange 
shortages. 
The East African Airways, which was run as a joint service, also 
disintegrated in 1974. Thereafter, each country organized its own national 
airline. Uganda Airlines was formed as a parastatal, whose priority was to 
serve government interests rather than exporters. 
The East African Statistical Department, based in Nairobi, was also 
dissolved in 1974. Subsequently, accurate Ugandan trade statistics became 
extremely difficult to collect. It is not clear whether the blanks in Table 1 are 
due to a genuine decline in trade, or partly due to poor statistics collection 
and/or smuggling. 
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Macroeconomic policies 
The 1970s were a period of insecurity. The state machinery to collect taxes 
broke down while expenditure on the civil war, especially in the second half 
of the 1970s, rose. This led to government borrowing from the Central Bank 
to finance recurrent expenditure, which was inflationary. 
To fight this inflation the government instituted price controls. Production 
of many essential commodities became unprofitable at fixed prices, and 
parallel markets in local commodities and imports boomed. The exchange rate 
was fixed, at Ug.Shs7 per US$ for a long time. In the face of rapid inflation, 
exporters began smuggling coffee across the borders as the domestic currency 
became overvalued. Cotton and other minor crops which were in excess supply 
in Kenya and did not benefit from smuggling, went out of production. The 
exchange rate policy, therefore, contributed to the shrinkage of cotton, tea and 
tobacco (see Table 1). Also, minor food exports (row (1) in Tables 2 and 3) 
declined as domestic prices for these crops, which were adjusting freely to 
demand and supply conditions under inflation, became more attractive than 
border prices at the fixed exchange rate. 
Coffee continued in production because it was a tree crop, but many 
shambas were poorly weeded and yields declined. The higher values in US$ 
(Table 1 row (1)) are due to the good international prices of coffee at the time. 
But low yields, smuggling and hoarding of stocks at various levels in the 
marketing chain, reduced the exportable quantities through the official channels 
(Ssemogerere, 1990). Apart from the disappearance of old exports, no new 
exports could emerge. A high rate of inflation, plus an over-valued exchange 
rate, did not provide incentives to develop new exports. 
Conclusions on export concentration in the 1970s 
To revive the export sector, the disruptive causes of the 1970s have to be 
addressed. The macroeconomic framework has to be improved, which means 
controlling inflation, setting a competitive and effect exchange rate, and paying 
remunerative prices to export producers promptly. Much deeper-seated 
development problems also have to be addressed, especially restoring 
confidence for private investment to finance processing and manufacturing 
capacity. The infrastructure has to be reconstituted for roads, railways and 
harbours. A statistical base needs to be set up to guide both policy-makers and 
exporters. 
Negotiations to reduce restrictions on intra-regional trade are also required, 
since the regional market can widen export opportunities. New exports with 
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good market prospects have to be found to replace the traditional primary 
commodities, especially coffee, whose high international prices from the 
Korean war boom cannot be recaptured. Given Uganda's comparative 
advantage in agricultural exports, the problem of crop-finance has to be 
addressed so that crops can be bought promptly from the farmer and moved 
to the export markets. The productivity of the peasant farmer also needs 
improvement. 
Problems beyond the 1970s 
Since the 1970s, new problems have arisen. The export environment of the 
1990s is now far more competitive and complex. For example, coffee, the 
leading export, is facing an international market characterized by over-
production and stocks from exporters with high-yielding new trees. African 
neighbours whose processing and manufacturing capacity and infrastructure 
were not disrupted, such as Kenya and Zimbabwe, are more competitive vis-a-
vis Uganda, than they were in the 1960s. 
Section III reviews the literature on export development and diversification 
with the purpose of identifying which factors Uganda should focus upon in the 
1990s if it is to correct the disruptive forces and the neglected opportunities 
of the past, as well as face the newly emerging competition. 
Ill a selective review of the literature 
on export development and diversification 
Introduction 
The purpose of reviewing the existing literature on export development and 
diversification is to identify which factors are likely to influence them in less 
developed countries (LDCs) in the 1990s. The review is divided into three 
sections: the theoretical basis for export development and diversification in 
LDCs today; quantitative economic models; and the institutional framework. 
The conclusion to this section draws lessons for Uganda. 
The theoretical basis for export development 
and diversification 
The old arguments 
Originally, the theoretical interest was on what role export diversification could 
play in reducing the variability of export earnings from the cyclical 
fluctuations in the international prices of primary commodities (MacBean, 
1966; MacBean et al., 1980). 
This literature produced inconclusive results, largely because of the different 
methodologies and data coverage used to measure instability and 
diversification; in any event, the measured instability was small.4 
More importantly, cyclical variability (rather than secular trend), does not 
by itself constitute a sufficient case for diversification since there are schemes 
to deal with it, for example, price stabilization schemes at home to protect the 
income of export producers and commodity schemes abroad to reduce 
fluctuations in international prices. Purely cyclical fluctuations should balance 
themselves out over time. 
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The current arguments for export diversification and development are partly 
a rebuttal from the development literature against the Ricardian static concept 
of comparative advantage which, when carried to its logical conclusion, 
advocates complete specialization to maximize the gains from trade (Chenery, 
1961). 
Since the 1970s, there have been both erratic swings and a secular decline-
in the international prices of primary commodities (especially agricultural raw 
materials and basic food stuffs), which commodity schemes, such as the ICO 
quota, have been unable to eliminate. The schemes shielded the primary 
export producers of these commodities from adjusting to demand and supply 
changes, thus worsening the downward secular trend by encouraging over-
production and the hoarding of stocks (Salvatore, 1983) Countries that 
specialized in a narrow range of primary commodities, are currently faced with 
declining export earnings and a loss in their share of the international export 
markets (IMF, 1986). 
The trend since 1970 has produced a theoretical reaction which argues that 
in a world of changing demand and supply conditions, international trade 
should be based on dynamic comparative advantage. The dynamic elements 
focused upon are demand and supply changes; risk evasion given imperfect 
foresight; environmental considerations and changes in commercial policies. 
Changes in demand Engle's law predicts that necessities are income 
inelastic. As income in the consuming country increases, the proportion spent 
on necessities declines. An exporter facing rising income in the importing 
country has to diversity by increasing the proportion of commodities which are 
income-elastic and reducing the proportion of necessities in order to realize 
rising export earnings. 
Even if incomes in the importing countries are constant, tastes change, and 
indifference maps shift over time, with changes in the psychological references 
of different generations of customers. This calls for diversification to generate 
new exports to cater for the changing desires and needs. Both incomes and 
tastes have been changing over time in the European and USA markets, which 
are the main customers of African exports, including Uganda (IMF, 1987b). 
Changes in supply Dynamic comparative advantage calls for diversification 
to develop new exports as the country adjusts its productive structure to 
changes in domestic resource endowments such as new skills from education, 
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or better land utilization that staves off diminishing returns, or changes in 
production technology and input mix, or changes in the availability of imported 
inputs in response to the foreign exchange constraint. 
E v e n if the resource base and inputs remained unchanged, a country's 
international competitiveness changes in response to the domestic 
macroeconomic environment, such as the rate of inflation and the 
competitiveness of other suppliers of identical commodities. Such changes will 
be reflected in movements in the real effective exchange rate which signals a 
reallocation of resources into a new diversity of exports. 
Complete specialization, especially in primary commodities with long 
gestation periods such as tree crops, creates an inflexible export structure in the 
short-run. Even if the price elasticities of supply of these commodities turn out 
to be large in the long-run, a country cannot adjust to short-run booms or 
declines in international prices. More importantly, it is also difficult to predict 
whether such price fluctuations are short-run and cyclical or whether they 
represent a secular trend that requires a re-allocation of resources. 
It is, therefore, desirable to diversify into commodities of different price 
elasticities of supply as a deliberate policy to keep the productive structure 
flexible, otherwise: 
Instability of exports earnings may not be reduced if diversification 
takes the form of elaborating traditional primary products exports or if 
the new products tend to exhibit the same phase of price fluctuations 
as traditional exports (IMF, 1987b, p. 43). 
Second, when planning to develop new exports, a country must have a broad 
awareness of what potential competitors are doing, to avoid moving into easily 
flooded markets: 
The successful adoption of policies to promote diversification, 
particularly in primary products, requires awareness of what others are 
doing — if all countries are shifting resources into the same 
commodities, a global over-supply can result [italics added](IMF, 
1987b, p. 18). 
Industrial capability Recent empirical literature shows a close and positive 
relationship between export diversity and industrial capability. The countries 
with rising export earnings are those with a higher proportion of manufactures 
in total exports which come from a thriving manufacturing sector. Industrial 
capability offers a country opportunities for product differentiation on the 
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supply side, 'new' products can be offered in the short-run even by just 
varying the package and label. On the demand side, within the 'product group', 
the differentiated commodities are close substitutes and therefore highly price 
elastic. This may explain why: 
The volume of selected manufactured exports may be raised without a 
compensating fall in prices because they are price elastic (IMF, 1987b, 
p. 16). 
A second consideration is that the industrial production environment is easier 
to control, compared with the unpredictable weather changes for agricultural 
commodities. Third, industrialization brings with it, or encourages the 
development of, a generalized infrastructure within which it is easier to reduce 
unit costs by supplying reliable power supply, better communication and 
information, etc. Lower costs thus increase the competitiveness of the home 
country in the international market. 
A word of caution is in order at this point. Measures to create industrial 
capacity raise deep-seated questions of development policy. Such measures 
must avoid creating export sectors with limited opportunities to grow (see 
Havrylyshyn, 1990, pp. 47-56 and 109-122). There is no rigid suggestion to 
produce any discrete commodities or follow a discrete pre-determined 
development sequence. Countries building new industrial capabilities and 
exports in the recent past have been able to diversity into a wide range of 
agricultural processing activities to add value and improve quality, such as 
with light manufactures and services (see Stern, 1989). 
Environmental considerations Change in the environment, and the response 
to it, are important factors affecting dynamic comparative advantage and world 
trade. The initial reaction of the more developed countries (MDCs) to 
environmental degradation has been to economize on the use of raw materials 
so as to reduce the cost of waste disposal. This tended to hurt exporters of 
primary commodities by reducing the demand for their products, leading to a 
secular decline in their international prices. 
More recently, however, tastes in many MDCs are changing towards 
'pollution-free' agricultural products, grown with a minimum of chemical 
inputs. The LDCs who have favourable weather and good soil are responding 
by exporting organically grown food, especially during the off-season period 
when MDCs cannot grow comparable products more cheaply. 
Obstacles in the LDCs that prevent the appropriate supply response are 
related to deep-seated development problems such as the lack of rapid 
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transport. to deliver these commodities fresh to the markets, or lack of 
processing capacity to preserve them in a form that lengthens their shelf-life. 
The association between industrial and export capacity becomes relevant in 
this case: as industrial capacity grows, the evidence over the last 15 years 
shows that processing capacity itself, plus the related infrastructure, increase 
the country's flexibility to process and supply agricultural commodities with 
high income and price elasticities of demand (see IMF, 1987b and 
Havrylyshyn, 1990). 
The debt problem The literature on the economics of development shows 
that there has been a large increase in debt owned by some very poor 
countries, especially in Africa, in the last 15 years. 
The absolute size of the debt, and its rate of growth, do not by themselves 
constitute the problem, since a country borrowing today to increase its 
productive capacity and repaying at a future date, is in long-run equilibrium. 
What concerns creditors instead is the ability of the LDCs to service the debt, 
i.e., the debt-service ratio or debt-service payments as a proportion of export 
earnings, thus reflecting lack of expansion of export capacity. 
The inability to service debt hampers the ability to borrow: in very poor 
countries this leads to cutting social services such as transport, health, etc., 
which depend on imported inputs supported by loans. Productive capacity also 
remains under-utilized and unemployment grows because of lack of imported 
inputs. The economic and social consequences of lack of imports, therefore, 
are grave. Among the various schemes suggested by the creditor countries is 
to tie the debt to the ability to service it, that is: 
In the decision to lend the conditions attached should be based on an 
assessment of the debt service capacity and financial management of 
the debtors as opposed to a willingness to accept conditionality (Stern, 
1989, p. 641). 
There is a real danger, therefore, that if a country specializing in primary 
exports cannot generate revenue to service its debt, it will be cut off from 
borrowing. In this case diversification of foreign exchange earnings is crucial 
in a country like Uganda which is borrowing heavily to finance imports (see 
Section I). 
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Trade barriers As the round of negotiations to reduce tariffs have proceeded 
under UNCTAD and under GATT, protection in the MDCs has substantially 
changed from tariffs to a proliferation of non-tariff regulations, sophisticated 
restraints, bargaining, etc. The political lobbies to protect agriculture in both 
the EEC and the USA have remained notably powerful and have dampened 
United Nations initiatives to reduce trade barriers. The enlargement of the EEC 
and the formation of the common market between Canada and the USA to 
provide countervailing power, are also feared by many LDCs as moves likely 
to increase trade barriers.5 
The immediate threat from trade barriers has affected 'the very developing 
countries that successfully diversified their export base in the 1970s. The 
newly industrialized developing countries are those confronting the greatest 
pressure to limit the inroads they are making into the markets of the industrial 
countries' (Salvatore, 1983, p. 18). 
Given their more flexible export structure, however, the responses of these 
newly industrialized countries to the threat of exclusion from older industrial 
markets have been interesting and varied. They have entered into joint ventures 
with multinationals to help them market their exports into the countries where 
they are likely to be excluded (UNCTC, 1990). A second strategy has been 
more sophisticated product differentiation into new qualities of the product 
which are not yet subjected to trade barriers. A third strategy has been to seek 
entry into new markets with less stringent barriers. 
In all three cases, non-tariff barriers have not reduced the exports and 
foreign exchange earnings of the newly industrialized countries; instead it is 
the productive structures of the MDCs which are becoming distorted. 
Diversification, therefore, is an important policy to adjust to a hostile 
international environment. 
The countries that have been granted preferential entry into protected 
markets, and are therefore not facing the threat of exclusion, have had no drive 
to diversity. Their earnings from primary exports have declined from the 
secular trend in international prices. 
The formation of regional markets by the LDCs has not been helpful in the 
development of diversification policy because many LDCs have pursued 
protectionist policies. Potentially, however, a regional market among the LDCs 
could provide an additional market for the home country which could form a 
learning ground to increase both production and marketing efficiency before 
entry into the international market. Furthermore, a regional market could be 
used as a collective tool by the member LDCs to bargain for rounds of trade 
liberalization with other regional blocks among the MDCs. 
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Risk evasion The inability to distinguish between a cyclical and secular 
movement in international prices introduces an important element of 
uncertainty in trade. When the supply response takes time, as in the case of 
primary exports from tree crops such as coffee, cocoa, rubber, etc, there is a 
danger of over investing to increase supply in response to a cyclical rather than 
a secular increase in international prices. This leads to over-production which 
can be worsened by commodity schemes. 
Some writers have suggested that during a boom, countries should 
accumulate reserves, and during a downturn, they should borrow. These 
policies only work if the fluctuations are cyclical. Even then, there is an 
opportunity cost to holding reserves, and a debt-service burden on borrowing. 
Alternatively, countries could pursue expansionist policies during the export 
boom and contract during a downturn. This intermittent pattern of expenditure 
reduces confidence in the economic system, however,'and limits specialization: 
production agents resort to subsistence to avoid the risk from contractory 
expenditure. It is preferable to spread the risk of fluctuations in international 
prices by diversifying the sources of foreign exchange earnings directly, by a 
deliberate drive to export commodities that are not subject to identical swings 
in international prices. This is the policy advocated by this paper. 
The case for export diversification: dynamic comparative 
advantage: a summary 
The theoretical case for export diversification based on dynamic comparative 
advantage is overwhelming and comprehensive. A country's comparative 
advantage changes over time in response to autonomous factors: tastes, 
technology, industrial capacity, competitiveness of other suppliers etc. In 
addition, policy induced changes also affect comparative advantage: for 
example, environmental considerations, debt management, trade barriers and 
risk evasion. A flexible export structure is necessary to generate the diversity 
of commodities required to enable a country to compete and ensure a rising 
steam of foreign exchange earnings over time. 
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Quantitative economic models for export development and 
diversification 
Quantitative models of comparative advantage can employ microeconomic 
models at a desegregated level which identify the supply or demand prospects 
for specific commodities for a country to develop and diversity into in order 
to increase its foreign exchange earnings. 
The demand models 
The demand models take the general form: 
where: 
X* = the quantity of exports of commodity X from LDC over time; 
Pyft = the export price, c.i.f, of the developing country in foreign 
exchange, for commodity X; 
Pwt = the average export price of X in the world market where the 
LDC is exporting; 
Ywt = the real income of the importing country. 
The growth rate of Xf over times, which determines the increase in foreign 
exchange earnings, can be derived as follows: 
(1) 
(2) dX? _ hXf (yw,) 6X? 
+ 
dt )\ 8 (Pxf / Pw) 
(Pxf / Pw) 
dt 
The partial derivative terms can be re-written as: 
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(3 ) 
bxf 
8 Y w . Yw. 
(4) a x, = £ X," 
a (Pxf / Pw) " (Pxf I Pw) 
where &y and ep are income and price elasticities of demand for Xdt in the 
importing country. 
Substituting the right hand side of Equations (3) and (4) into the right hand 
expressions of Equation (2) and dividing both sides of Equation (2) by Xf 
gives the growth rate of the export commodity as: 
( 5 ) ( ^ L / x f i 
dt 
dYw, 
( ' / Yw)+ £ 
dt 
d (Pxf / Pw) 
dt 
/ 
Px, 
Pw. 
Equation (5) says that the growth rate of the export commodity X, to the 
importing country, depends on the income elasticity of demand £y times the 
annual rate of change in income (the first bracketed term to the right), plus the 
price elasticity of demand £p times the rate of change of the price of 
relative to the average world price over time. Since £p is negative, and the 
percentage change in the relative price is also negative, the second term is 
positive. If Equation (5) were empirically estimated, it would take the form:6 
(6) 
In Xf = b0 + £ a{ In Yw, + £ a'2 In (Pxf / Ps) 
let b = e a, and b„ = £ a7 
The co-efficients b0, b1 and b2 would have the following meaning: 
= would represent the historical factors affecting exports eg, the 
initial costs of breaking into the market. The harder to break 
into the market for example, the lower would be the growth rate 
initially, and b0 would be small. 
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by the growth elasticity of exports of with respect to income in 
the importing country 
\ 
i.e., dYwt 
' dt 
/ Ywt or ey . ry 
\ y 
by = (ey) . (ry). This is a product term rather than a simple elasticity of 
demand. 
The meaning of bx is as follows: if X? is income elastic in the importing 
country, as income of the importer increases, the demand for X* will grow, nnd 
Ey would be positive. But ry = the growth rate of income; this determines the 
rate at which the demand curve of X\ in the importing country will shift out 
to the right. Similarly: 
b2 = the growth elasticity of exports of Xf with respect to relative 
prices P. Jj, / Pwt. 
b2 = (ep) . (rp). This is again a product term rather than a simple price 
elasticity of demand. 
The meaning of b2 is as follows: if X\ is price elastic in the importing country, 
as the exporter becomes more competitive, relative to the average of other 
exporters, P% declines relative to Pw\, and X'J replaces imports from the other 
countries. 
The growth rate rp determines the speed at which Px* declines relative to 
Pwv It bears a negative sign. The co-efficient b2 is positive because it is a 
product of two negative terms ep and rp.7 
The desegregation of the demand model in Equation (5) before estimation 
highlights its theoretical usefulness. For a commodity to have good market 
prospects abroad the necessary condition is that the demand for such a 
commodity is both income and price-elastic. 
For an exporting country to realize a rapidly rising stream of foreign 
exchange earnings from this commodity, however, it is not sufficient to simply 
pick commodities with high income and price elasticities of demand for export 
development and diversification. These only refer to parts of the growth 
elasticities ey and ep. In addition, the income of the importing country must 
be growing (a positive ry) and the exporting country itself must maintain 
competitiveness in the international market (a positive absolute value of rp). 
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The supply models 
Unlike the demand models, there if no uniform structure for the supply 
models. The formulation depends on the production function from which a 
particular supply model is derived. Most supply models are reduced from the 
constant elasticity of substitution production function of the form: 
(7) Q - A [ 8 iT p + ( 1 - 8 ) L~P] J / p 
where 
Q = the quantity of output for export; 
A = the efficiency parameter, referring to technological change that 
augments the productivity of the factors of production; 
K = capital; 
L = labour; 
8 = the distribution parameter determining the relative contribution 
of each factor of production to total output; 
p = the substitution parameter governing factor intensity. 
The simplification of Equation (7) to the reduced form is undertaken to 
estimate the supply response to a number of independent variables expected 
to influence the tradable commodity. For example, a commonly estimated 
supply function, in implicit form: 
(8) c^ln [(Px: . ER) / P() + c2 In ( (P< , . ER) / p j 
where 
= the quantity of exports produced, of the individual commodity in 
the LDC; 
Px = the export price of X in foreign exchange 
P = the overall domestic price level in local currency i.e. P = ER.Pw, 
where Pw is the world price in foreign currency. 
ER = the nominal exchange rate of the LDC, in local currency per unit 
of the foreign currency. 
Z = the proxy for capacity utilization in the case of industrial output; 
T - the proxy for weather in the case of agricultural output. 
The dependent variable can also be divided by one of the factors of production 
whose productivity is the subject of study, X /^Z, to denote output per unit of 
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land, or land productivity, for example, where Z, indicates hectares of arable 
land. 
The exchange rate (ER) is an important independent variable since it relates 
the domestic price to the international price and influences the relative 
profitability of exporting compared to supply the domestic market. 
The terms in Equation (8) are usually lagged to indicate that total supply 
adjustment may take longer than one period, and long-run supply elasticities 
are larger than the short-run ones.8 
Measures or indices of competitiveness 
The concern to an exporter to produce a commodity for the world market is 
that the realisable world price in Uganda shillings covers the costs of exports 
and an adequate profit margin. The exporter's attraction to transact in the 
export commodity is a function of the size of this margin. The bigger the 
margin, the more attractive is a commodity. The economic basis of analysing 
export competitiveness of a commodity on the world market is therefore based 
on: 
• Value added in foreign exchange (IVA); 
• The Domestic Resources Cost (DRC) incurred to earn the value added; 
• The foreign costs incurred to realize the export benefit. 
The DRC is the domestic resource cost for a unit of net foreign exchange 
earned from exports: 
(9) DRC - f —L 
U IVAj 
where 
LCj = local costs in accounting prices of the inputs used in the 
production of the commodity j. 
IVAj = international value added in foreign exchange, calculated net of 
the foreign costs of producing jth commodity. 
The index of competitiveness or the DRC ratio (Cj) is the ratio between the 
domestic resource costs and the official exchange rate (E), For a commodity 
to be competitive, the DRC should be less than the exchange rate, ie, Cj should 
be less than one: 
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Models of the competitiveness have two advantages: 
1. By ranking exports, they indicate to the policy maker which commodities 
should be developed first; 
2. The production data required on imported local inputs, and on the 
opportunity cost of labour, can be collected in a survey at a point in time, 
unlike the time-series data needed to estimate the demand and supply 
models. The coefficients can be updated periodically provided that a data 
collecting system is set up and maintained. 
However, whether the commodities ranked can be successfully exported 
depends on other additional factors in the importing country such as trade 
barriers, income and price-elasticities of demand. Also, the home country must 
successfully compete with other exporters to the foreign market. 
Programming export development 
Despite the apparent simplicity of the DRC indices, the calculations have two 
serious defects: 
1. They do not take into account the scarcity of non-traded inputs. It is 
assumed that the supply on non-traded inputs is perfectly elastic ic, extra, 
quantities of these inputs can be produced if more are needed. In a situation 
where a country faces several supply bottlenecks of non-traded inputs, eg, 
those of skilled labour, this assumption is not warranted (Stern, 1989, pp. 
649-50). 
2. IC devaluations are based on the index of competitiveness, one may end up 
protecting high costs producers with no prospects of improving productive 
efficiency. It is advisable to calculate E independently, as the equilibrium 
exchange rate for the economy and use C-s to determine which products are 
competitive at that exchange rate. In practice governments tend to operate 
multiple exchange rates for purposes of encouraging exports or to base 
ad justments in the official exchange rate on supporting principal exports. 
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The programming approach yields shadow prices equal to the social 
opportunity cost of producing both tradeables and non-tradeables at the 
equilibrium exchange rate for the economy. This is an important advantage. 
Second, in formulating the programme, the scarce resources required to 
produce exports can be carefully entered as binding constraints to the 
feasibility of the programme. 
The programme for export development needs not be too large. A few key 
sectors can be concentrated upon to keep computation and data demands to the 
minimum: for these reasons, we have mentioned programming under micro 
models — i.e. it can be used to examine key sectors and scarce resources 
(rather than the big version that examines the whole economy).9 
Data problems and quantitative models in Uganda 
All four proposed models require data for computation, which is not readily 
available. Because of this the models have no immediate practical value. 
The demand model requires desegregated time-series on the quantity 
demanded of Xdt, the export price PxAx, the average world price Pwt, and the real 
income of the importing country, Fwt. While average world prices, and real 
income each individual importing countries are available, international prices 
of commodities at a desegregated level are difficult to get. 
In Uganda, there is no output data on individual commodities, even on 
coffee the leading export. The supply model cannot be estimated from 
Equation (8) either. 
The Agricultural Secretariat of the Bank of Uganda set up a method to 
compute the DRC for traditional cash crops and is gradually moving into non-
traditional food crops. This is the best source of such a data base. Policy 
makers should increase the resources to support it so that the DRC ratios of 
more exports can be computed. 
There is no programming model for the economy: the Ministry of Planning 
is just starting the preparations for such a model. But before the overall 
economy can be programmed, work on key sectors and critical bottlenecks 
should start. 
The purpose of reviewing the literature on quantitative models, therefore, 
is to isolate the explanatory variables which Uganda must pay attention to in 
export development and diversification. These are equilibrium exchange rates, 
producer prices, income and price elasticities of demand, growth rates in real 
income for her customers abroad, and the competitiveness of other suppliers 
to these customers. Awareness of these variables and the relative urgency for 
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their computation by the methods indicated can guide policy. We intend to 
refer to these variables in the later policy analysis. 
The institutional framework 
Voluminous literature exists on the institutional framework for export 
development and diversification. However, most of this literature is tailored to 
individual commodities rather than general principles to promote export 
development and diversification. In this section we shall select the few general 
principles for discussion and will cover the specific recommendations as we 
analyse the constraints facing the individual commodities subsequently. 
The most useful approach is to identify the actors and discuss the desirable 
institutional framework within which they should promote export development 
and diversification. The actors are: government, export producers, private 
investors and donors. 
Government 
The heterogeneity of non-traditional exports does not render itself easily to 
government control. Instead: 
Government must limit its role to areas where the private sector is 
lacking, thereby reinforcing private initiatives rather than undermining 
them (Schapiro, 1986). 
This limited but reinforcing role requires government to first maintain security 
so that the general environment is predictable. Security here is interpreted not 
to mean the continuation of one regime or one person in power for a long time 
(until violently removed) but consistency and clarity of economic policy 
regardless of the regime in power, so that investors can reasonably predict the 
likely effect of public policies on their projects.10 
Second, the government must formulate and implement a consistent 
macroeconomic framework within which the price system can allocate 
resources efficiently. This includes, in particular, maintaining a real effective 
exchange rate that reflects a country's comparative advantage, fiscal and 
monetary policies that stabilize the general price level, and a flexible 
production system which allows producers to quickly adjust to changing 
market conditions. 
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In countries which have successfully diversified their exports in the last 15 
years, what mattered at the macro-level was: 
.... a stable non-inflationary environment, where there were few 
restrictions on private initiative, and where public sector spending 
complemented rather than competed with private capital.11 
Repeated devaluations to adjust the nominal exchange rate to inflation, which 
are not accompanied by policies to correct the causes of inflation, portray an 
unstable macroeconomic environment and reduce investor confidence. 
Adjustment in nominal exchange rates to accommodate prevailing 
inflation ... tend to reduce investor confident and encourage investment 
in financial assets or real assets that appreciate with the increase in 
prices rather than in productive activities (IMF, 1987b). 
Here stabilization must also integrate markets: continuation of parallel markets 
in foreign exchange or smuggling may be a sign of lack of confidence and a 
flight from repeated devaluations. Real producer prices can only be 
maintained in a stable macroeconomic framework. There is a danger that using 
frequent devaluations to maintain real producer prices can result in mark-ups 
for even inefficient producers (a problem we shall consider in Section VI). 
Third, the government must develop the infrastructure that promotes 
exports. This includes research into new commodities and quality improvement 
of existing commodities; gathering market intelligence on prices, quality, 
marketing channels, factors that determine entry into new markets, and 
competitiveness of the home country relative to other suppliers in these 
markets; improving general communication and transport to enable exporters 
to meet delivery schedules, and to guarantee continuous supply; and providing 
other public utilities eg. electricity. 
The fact that Kenyan exporters can deliver fresh cut flowers from the field 
to European markets in 48 hours indicates what governments can 'do right' to 
promote exports. The government played its re-enforcing role by maintaining 
infrastructure so that exporters could negotiate and schedule transport routines 
for perishables efficiently. Cut flowers account for 50% of foreign exchange 
earnings within the group of Horticultural exports from Kenya (Schapiro, 
1986). • 
Fourth, the government must formulate and administer incentives to export 
producers such as an investment code to attract both local and foreign 
investment; appropriate credit and interest rate policies; producer prices that 
cover production costs plus a reasonable profit margin that allows for 
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reinvestment; extension services and training to upgrade the quality of specific 
commodities, and to increase productivity. 
The literature on incentives to exporters is cautious, however: it notes that 
excessively generous incentives can yield negative value added to the local 
economies eg. some badly negotiated Export processing Zones where exports 
can turn out to the import-intensive with no linkages to the local economy 
except for hiring unskilled labour (Warr, 1989, and see Fizgerald and Manson, 
1989). 
Fifth, the government must also negotiate to eliminate trade barriers into 
both external and regional markets, and to open up transport and 
communication channels into these markets. The elimination of regional trade 
restrictions is particularly useful in four respects: 
• First, regional markets provide a training ground to local firms to market 
more efficiently before they attempt to enter into the international markets: 
this would entail learning to package, label, clear the product, etc, and 
positioning it into the marketing niches. 
• Second, the elimination of regional trade restrictions forces local firms to 
operate at lower unit costs and fully utilize the plant to supply a large 
markets. The firms would also have to abandon monopolistic practice in 
order to stay competitive. 
• Third, cultivating a regional market cushions a local firm's export earnings: 
when international prices for its product fluctuate, the surpluses/shortages 
can be ironed out by reducing/increasing regional supplies. 
• Fourth, the home country may be able to secure more concessions in the 
international market if it can team up with its neighbours to negotiate with 
the MDC's individually, or in their trading blocks, eg, the EEC versus the 
ACP countries.12 Policies to increase the efficiency of local firms are not 
easy to implement, however. The firms that cannot complete and are 
threatened to close down decampaign the regional market as a source of 
losses to the local economy. The solution for the home country is not to 
protect high cost producers, however. Instead, the home country must face 
the challenge from regional liberalization with development policies that 
reappraise its comparative advantage and assist new competitive firms to 
enter into production to supply the regional market while the non-
competitive firms close down and exit. The overall increase in efficiency 
should yield higher output and employment. 
• Many LDCs have fiscal deficit and meagre sources of revenue: they are ill-
equipped to invest into export development and diversification. The 
literature notes that apart from purely infrastructural facilities, the 
governments does not need to contribute much capital investment. The 
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general supportive regulatory framework is sufficient to attract piivate 
capital, both local and foreign (see IMF, 1987b; Havrylyshyn, 1990; 
UNCTC, 1990; Stern 1989; Schapiro, 1986; Weiss, 1990). 
The export producers 
Producers must learn from the stiff competition characteristic of both regional 
and international markets, and must develop: 
1. Production technologies with high yields, low costs, superior quality, and 
flexibility to adjust to changing market conditions; 
2. Product qualities that are tailored to specific customer requirements. This 
demands intimate knowledge of customers and becomes more stringent as 
one exports differentiated luxuries rather than necessities which are 
homogeneous; 
3. Delivery systems that are reliable and regular, to earn customer confidence 
and maintain markets; 
4. Properly packed, labelled and certified shipments to avoid damages; 
5. Overall, export producers must take education, training, extension courses, 
and up to date information, seriously in order to stay in business. Apart 
from government assistance at critical times, the export producers 
themselves must form their own associations to police and educate 
themselves as an on going activity.13 
Private foreign investment 
Even with a moderate amount of capital transfer, private foreign investment 
can increase export development and diversification by: 
1. Bringing essential inputs not available locally, on a regular basis, both 
physical inputs and technical assistance; 
2. Helping local partners to break into international markets by providing 
marketing intelligence that would be difficult to acquire by local exporters 
alone. 
Despite its desirable roles, the prospects for direct foreign investment into 
Africa in the 1990s has been bleak. Such investment critically evaluates the 
numerous restrictions which African governments are only beginning to 
dismantle. As the governments implement the structural adjustment 
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programmes, which are initially contractory as they force inefficient business 
to close down, they add to the scepticism of outside investors. 
The investors compare unfavourably the numerous infrastructural constraints 
in Africa, which would take time to overcome even if the economies are 
liberalized, for example electricity, telecommunications, etc, but which are 
absent in other countries with ready made infrastructure. Infrastructure 
increases the rate of return on investment and shortens the gestation period, a 
factor which weights against Africa. The investors prefer to team up in joint 
ventures with local entrepreneurs who have demonstrated success; these are 
few in Africa: by the time they appear in large numbers foreign investment 
will not be so critical any more.14 
The bleak picture does not apply to all cases equally, however. A country 
with a well-thought out export development policy can actively shop around 
for private foreign investment to address specific bottlenecks. This requires 
more domestic homework but yields better results than haphazard incentives.15 
The donors 
Foreign aid has proved a mixed-blessing in export development and 
diversification. It can be used to buy surplus commodities off the local market 
for shipment to needy populations, and thus sustain prices of exportables. 
Often, however, it dumps other items on the local market that depress the 
prices of tradable. 
Foreign aid can also provide essential inputs not available locally. Even 
here, however, the tendency is to push obsolete equipment and technology to 
the LDCs which prevents them from becoming competitive in the international 
market.16 
Lessons for Uganda from the literature 
Uganda cannot enjoy rising foreign exchange earnings in the 1990s unless it 
diversifies the export base from primary commodities with long gestation 
periods and less flexible supply response, eg, coffee. 
The new trade pattern should be developed on the basis of dynamic 
comparative advantage to ensure flexibility to adjust to changing economic 
conditions both in Uganda, abroad in the MDCs, and within the region vis-d-
vis direct competitors. The relevant variables from demand, supply and 
institutional factors have already been identified. 
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Given the current resource constraints, the inland location without access 
to the sea, and the need to minimize costs in order to compete, Uganda should 
diversify into exports of high quality, low weight, requiring a minimum of 
initial capital, using a relatively labour intensive technology, and having a 
short gestation period. The literature does not suggest any specific list of 
commodities to diversify into. We shall examine a feasible list in Section V. 
The micro economic quantitative models are not of immediate practical 
value to assist policy makers to identify feasible exports. They do, however, 
point out variables which should not be neglected. As a matter of urgency 
Uganda should improve its database especially in the areas we are going to 
point out in Section IV. Better data would enable her to use the quantitative 
micro-models to identify feasible exports and evaluate policies. 
Rebuilding processing and industrial capacity will be needed to increase the 
flexibility in the exports sector. A supportive macroeconomic framework 
appears more necessary than state capital to invest into the export sector. 
Consistent exchange rate policy backed by fiscal and monetary policies are the 
essential ingredients of the supportive framework. Building infrastructure, 
unifying markets, negotiations to improve regional trade, are also important 
within this framework. 
External aid will generally add lower value to the local economy the more 
it is tied. Director foreign investment is preferable but it will be difficult to 
obtain. Whatever can be mobilized will be used most productively if it is 
directed to .specific bottlenecks in an export-development programme carefully 
thought out by Ugandans themselves. 
Export producers will need training and information to face up to stiff 
international and regional competition. Such training should be jointly 
undertaken by government and the private sector. 
IV Data and methodology 
There is no uniform methodology used to collect the data for this study due 
to lack of reliable sources on non-traditional exports. Most data systems, such 
as agricultural output statistics, inter-territorial trade, etc, broke down in the 
1970s and have not been properly replaced. Existing trade statistics contain 
numerous gaps and it is generally unclear whether the gaps reflect a 
disappearance of a commodity from the export list or under-reporting because 
of poor statistical collection. 
Cumbersome procedures to obtain export licenses, plus the over-valuation 
of the exchange rate, lead to smuggling. Because of this, official trade statistics 
misrepresent the amount of trade transacted. 
Some non-traditional exports we identifies are new and just about to enter 
the export statistics; we could only collect data on these by interviewing 
prospective exporters. This section describes a variety of methodologies for 
each type of data collected to analyse the issues in this paper. 
Identification of actual and potential exports for development 
and diversification 
Bank of Uganda sources 
Statistics on non-traditional exports were extracted from the Quarterly 
Economic Reports of the Research Department of the Bank of Uganda. The 
Bank is supposed to track export proceeds on the basis of exports licenses 
verified by the exports section of the exchange control department. 
Unfortunately, few exporters brought export licenses to the Bank for 
verification due to the overvalued exchange rate and cumbersome export 
procedures that prevailed before July 1990. This makes the data incomplete. 
The Retention Account Scheme, launched in August 1989, permits exporters 
to retain 100% of their export-oriented business ventures and/or for importing 
goods in demand by the Ugandan public. Exporters were supposed to open 
foreign exchange retention accounts with their commercial banks. However, 
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by April 1990 only 29 export retention accounts had been opened. This 
scheme, therefore, has also failed so far to improve data collection by the Bank 
of Uganda. 
Following trade liberalization policies announced in July 1990, including the 
licensing of forex bureaux (to be discussed later), the role of the Bank of 
Uganda in the export business has been marginalised. Exporters are no longer 
required to have their licenses verified by the Bank or even have expenditure 
of foreign exchange earnings controlled. The role of the Bank is now reduced 
to tracking down foreign exchange receipts from non-traditional exports, 
The Export Promotion Council 
The Council keeps a working Register of Exporters showing actual exports 
they are taking or intend to take. We extracted a long list of items from this 
Register. However, exporters only register when they need specific services 
from the Council. Also, some items on the Register represent declared wishes 
but are not actually exported. Other exporters, though still on the register, are 
no longer in business. There is a need to set up and continuously update the 
list of active exporters, the potential constituency of the Council. This could 
provide the beat sample frame from which to draw samples of exporters: at the 
moment, it is incomplete. 
The Ministry of Commerce 
In implementing the Dual Licensing Incentive Scheme, whereby the exporters 
are supposed to return an equal value of foreign exchange earned in actual 
imports, the Ministry keeps working files on Licenses Approve for the 
exporters. We used these files to improve upon our list of exports. However, 
to cut through the lengthy procedures to obtain an export license (which have 
only been simplified in 1990), business managers have been obtaining and 
hoarding licenses or simply selling them to other exporters who have no time 
to apply. Therefore, by looking at licenses issued, the Report of a Committee 
on Uganda Airlines Freight and Handling Charges noted that: 
One is not sure whether exporting has been done at all or whether 
export proceeds have been diverted (including capital flight) (Kawanga, 
1990, p. 3). 
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The Ministry of Agriculture compiled a list of horticultural exports in July 
1989. The list shows estimated production in 1989 and projected production 
for 1991. The list also shows estimated and projected exportable quantities in 
1989 and 1990-91 respectively. This data would have been a good source of 
what products can be produced in Uganda and the surplus available for export. 
But the data gives over exaggerated numbers of both production and exports. 
Many key informants interviewed noted that the production data is estimated 
from offices, not in the field; it is therefore partly imaginary. The system of 
paying statisticians in the field a living wage, plus providing them with the 
necessary equipment and transport, broke down in the 1970 (Makerere 
University, 1990). 
Border trade exports to Kenya: observations 
A thriving boarder trade flourishes between Uganda and Kenya. This trade is 
not officially recorded as exporters avoid the cumbersome procedure of 
obtaining recommendations for export licenses from the local Government 
Resistance Councils. We sent an observer to the Kenyan boarder to record 
what items he saw actually being exported through panya roads (non-official 
crossing points), several times. We added these exports to our list. Time and 
resources did not allow us to observe the Western and Northern boarders 
which are also active. Therefore, whatever we added was only partial. 
Semi-structured interviews 
Due to the lack of reliable time series on non-traditional exports, we resorted 
to interviews to build data that can be used in analysing the non-traditional 
export sector especially in estimating the profitability of exports and the break-
even exchange rates. A semi-structured questionnaire was developed and 
applied to exporters identified as active on the basis of regular shipments. 
The PTA survey data 
The Commonwealth Fund for Technical Co-operation funded a study 
summarized in the Report on the Market Survey in Kenya, Tanzania and 
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Zimbabwe for Selected Products. The items identified were added to our non-
traditional exports list. 
Data from the 1970s 
Table 1, 2 and 3 of Section II were re-examined to identify which items can 
be revived for export and these were added to the list. 
Conclusions on export identification data 
Both quantities and values of exports from such diverse sources were 
incomplete, non-comparable, and sometimes outright guesses. Obviously, 
Uganda must develop a data base to guide policy on non-traditional exports, 
starting with as much documentation as possible from the list of exports we 
have identified. 
Macroeconomic data and institutional analysis 
Data on inflation, exchange rates and local market prices are available and up 
to date from the Research Department, bank of Uganda and from the Ministry 
of Planning and Economic Development. With respect to institutional data, we 
obtained a number of reports on export promotion and transport. The issues 
raised were cross-checked with several key informants interviewed. We also 
organized a seminar on Foreign Trade Policy and National Development in 
November 1989 at which exporters, academicians, and policy makers, 
discussed several institutional constraints. The proceedings supplemented our 
reports (Makerere University, 1990). 
In general, the institutional data and macroeconomic aggregates are more 
reliable than the data on production and trade flows. However, there is a need 
to catalogue and keep the reports in one reference library so that they are 
easily accessible. The same reference library should also stock the policy 
papers describing export incentive schemes, which many exporters are unaware 
of because they are scattered in different Ministries. 
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Export prices 
The Export Promotion Council keeps data on international prices of some 
horticultural crops. The prices represent the best market prices an exporter 
shipping the best quality items at peak seasons can realise. The exporters 
interviewed received much lower prices as they had less experience in quality 
control and marketing. These prices also need continuous review and should 
be available on a daily basis to enable exporters to calculate profitability of a 
consignment before shipment, like the practice in Kenya. Efforts by the PTA 
Secretariat to link member countries by computer listings of quantities, 
qualities and price of different commodities available in member countries etc, 
is a move in the right direction. 
Local prices of exportables 
A few of the export items have local prices published by the Ministry of 
Planning. This provides a basis for comparing the profitability of exporting 
versus supplying the local market. For other prices of exportables, we took 
what the exporters told us, which can be under-estimates to hide profitability 
and to escape taxation. Some exports, eg, horn tips, have no local prices 
because they are not consumed locally. 
Income and price elasticities of demand 
From the arguments of dynamic comparative advantage reviewed in the 
literature, we wanted to ascertain whether the commodities identified were 
income and price elastic. Since there were no time-series to calculate these 
elasticities at a desegregated level, elasticity estimates contained in the IMF 
report (1987a) on groups of commodities with similar characteristics to those 
produced in Uganda have been adopted. We have also made use of the report 
by Islam (1989) to extract elasticities for groups of horticultural exports. 
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Comparable data from other countries 
To assess Uganda's competitiveness, we collected data from Tanzania and 
Kenya. Comparative data from Kenyan horticultural exports were obtained 
from two secondary sources: Schapiro (1986) and Hormann and Will (1986). 
It was not possible to update the data because it takes too long to obtain 
research clearance in Kenya. Other data on Kenya was obtained from the 
Annual Economic Survey and Statistical Abstract. 
A fieldwork trip was made to Tanzania where primary data on their Export 
Retention Scheme, formed in October 1986 to diversify exports, was compiled 
from the riles of the National Bank of Commerce. It was up-to-date and 
reliable because of the monitoring scheme used to follow the flow of exports 
and imports and the use of the Foreign Exchange Retention Account. The 
Tanzania data collection method provides a practical and useful lesson for 
Uganda to improve on data collection. 
V Identification of non-traditional exports 
which can be developed rapidly 
This section analyses the data presented in Tables 8-13. The purpose is to 
identify exports with bright market prospects which Uganda can develop 
immediately to solve its crisis. The analysis follows the literature reviewed in 
Section III, which spells out desirable characteristics of exports which should 
be selected for development and diversification. 
Because of the severe data limitations, the analysis is descriptive. Most of 
the time was spent reconciling data from different sources. We do hope, 
however, that the information assembled is clear enough to guide initial 
policies. 
Potential and actual non-traditional exports: current practice 
Table 8 presents data on actual non-traditional exports, and potential exports 
just entering the market; the potential exports are represented with two dots to 
prevent insignificant numbers from being entered in the table. The table 
indicates that non-traditional exports flow are minute, adding up to only 8.99% 
of the total exports of US$22.64 million in 1989. The effort needed to develop 
this sector is substantial, if the policy objective of US $100 million earnings 
per year is to be realized. 
Second, trade flows are not only minute, they are also intermittent: past 
policies have been unable to enlist a consistently rising value of exports. This 
intermittent picture contrasts with that of Tanzania in Table 9, where an Export 
Retention Scheme to diversify exports, started in October 1986, is producing 
statistically visible results in two years. Uganda must be prepared to face stiff 
competition even from relatively underdeveloped neighbours like Tanzania. 
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Commodity 1 9 8 1 1 9 8 2 1 9 8 3 1 9 8 4 1 9 8 5 1 9 8 6 1 9 8 7 1 9 8 8 1 9 6 9 
charge 
(j. processed or manufactured goods 
Gables, 
plastics - -
Cotton seed - - 0.12 0.01 .. 0.01 0.01 
cbKB 
Electricity - - 0.91 0.97 0.77 0.38 3.31 
Handicrafts - - 0.01 
Lint - - - - - . . . . . . . . 
Safari suits - - - 0.02 
(textiles) 
Cattle horn tips - - - - - - .. ..Q10 
Hides - - 3.18 4.51 0.77 0.33 0.22 3.59 6.67 
and skins 
Other - - 1.50 0.02 .. 0.15 0.28 
traditional exports 
Total - - 3.77 6.32 5.59 1.40 1.06 11.72 2264 
non-traditional exports 
Notes: there is a discrepancy in totals between Table 1, last row, and Table 8 last row. 
In Table 1, non-traditional exports contributed at most 3% in total exports receipts. 
Table 8 shows 8.99%: this larger figure may be due over-reported, adding smuggled 
items, et. The uncertainty of data raises one of the biggest constraints facing policy-
makers. 
Third, the bulk of exports consists of unprocessed raw materials (entries 1-4 
in Table 8) of which agricultural food stuffs predominate (entries 1 and 2). 
Uganda will have to seriously consider replacement and expansion of her 
processing capacity. Given her inland locating and high transportation costs, 
some processing is necessary to add value and lengthen the shelf-life of the 
commodities. 
In the processed categories, food and agricultural items predominate (entries 
5 and 6). The exceptions are cable plastics, electricity and handicrafts. This 
suggests that agro-based industries will be the most logical starting point to 
process, manufacture, and differentiate, to build a more flexible export base. 
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Table 9 Tanzania: export retention scheme, export 
receipts by commodity catagory, 1987-88 
(US$ million) 
Commodity category 1987 1988 
Agricultural products 5.98 13.07 
Tourism industry 3.53 7.76 
Forest products 1.22 3.00 
Sea (marine) products 1.43 3.06 
Live animals and birds 0.18 0.59 
Sub-total 10.91 27.48 
Industrial products 0.39 0.79 
Minerals (game stone) 
Other exports 0.44 1.54 
Sub-total 1.23 2.33 
Grant total 12.23 29.81 
Source: United Republic of Tanzania, National Bank of 
Commerce, March 1990. 
Identification of exports for development and diversification in 
the immediate future 
Table 8 gives only the current practice. This need not be optimal: it may 
contain high-cost products in which Uganda cannot develop comparative 
advantage, or products whose international demand is declining and therefore 
products which are likely to face a secular decline in international prices. Since 
it is not diversification per se but diversification to increase earnings, Table 8 
needs to be carefully combed to pick out only those commodities with the best 
prospects to recommend for policy action. 
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Hi st, to ensure rising exports earnings, the commodities in which Uganda 
diversifies should have high and rising international prices. Tables 10-12 
presents international prices data on Uganda's exports. In Table 10, the food 
grains are low-priced, with the exception of cashew nuts. Even in the 
neighbouring countries, food items are still low-priced in Table 11. Only 
ground nuts improve their price in Nairobi, Kigali and Dar-es-Salaam. 
Uganda will have to reduce production and marketing costs and raise 
productivity to earn reasonable revenue from these low-priced exports. Uganda 
should also search for high-priced food items such as vanilla and cashew nuts 
for subsequent policy especially given its inland location and heavy transport 
cost to the sea. Transport costs account for 30 - 47% of total export costs to 
Mombasa (USAID, 1988). Air freight to Europe also accounts for about the 
same proportion for the relevant commodities. 
Further, a comparison of Tabes 10 and 11 with Table 12 shows that the 
prices of non-traditional exports are not much better than those of traditional 
exports. These figures should convince Uganda that when diversifying, the 
existing traditional exports should also be kept for some time until new exports 
with high international prices can be sufficiently developed to provide the 
export base. 
International market prices for horticultural commodities presented in Table 
13 are much higher, on the average, than the prices in Table 10 -12. However, 
many exporters we talked to indicated that they received much lower prices for 
horticultural exports than those in Table 13. The problems cited were low 
quality of export produce; intermittent delivery schedules, and improper 
packaging etc. Since the problems cited by Ugandan exporters originate from 
Uganda rather than from the international market, these problems must be 
addressed immediately. 
The demand side: income and price elasticities of demand 
We could not find income and price elasticities of demand at the individual 
commodity level, except at best, the data in Tables 14 and 15. In general, the 
countries that were used to compute the elasticities in Tables 14 and 15 had 
rising real GDP over the relevant periods: therefore, we did not need to 
investigate separately whether the markets were growing or not. On the 
average, over the relevant period, the annual rates of growth of real GNP were: 
Canada 4.0%, United states 2.7%, and Europe 2.5%. 
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Table 10 Market prospects: international prices of non-
traditional exports: excluding horticulture (US$ per kg, 
parity prices), 1988-89 
1988 1989 1990 (cif Europe) 
Bean 0.55 0.50 0.58 
Groundnuts 0.35 0.35 0.39 
Maize 0.17 0.13 0.11 
Simsim 0.76 0.76 0.76 
Soyabean 0.22 0.27 0.36 
Cashewnuts 12.00 
Source: USAID, 1988, Ministry of Planning, 1989, and Bank of 
Uganda, 1989. 
Table 11 Market prospects: prices of food crops in capital cities 
of neighbouring countries, 1988 (US$ per kg) 
Kigali Dar-es-Salaam Nairobi 
Beans 0.47 0.18 0.38 
Groundnuts 1.20 0.96 0.84 
Maize 4.40 0.67 0.19 
Dry onions .. .. 0.80 
Source: USAID, 1988. 
Table 12 Market prospects: international prices of traditional 
export to European markets, 1990 (US$ per kg) 
Commodity April 1990 November 1990 
Coffee Arabica 1.25 1.52 
Coffee robusta 0.95 1.23 
Cotton 1.50 1.85 
Tea 1.30 2.20 
Tobacco 1.80 
Cocoa 0.85 1.25 
Source: Ministry of Planning, April 1990, and Bank of Uganda, 1990. 
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Table 13 Horticultural exports: average international market prices, 1989 
(US$ per kg) 
Average 
Commodity 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1988/89 
1. Aubergines 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.3 2.0 
2. Avocados 1.4 2.5 2.4 2.4 2.5 2.5 
3. Bananas (bogoya) 3.6 3.6 3.2 2.9 2.9 (1.6) 
4. Bananas (green) 2.4 2.8 2.7 2.9 2.9 
5. Beans (green) 2.4 2.8 2.7 2.9 2.9 3.8 
6. Capsicum 3.0 
7. Chillies 3.4 4.4 4.3 3.8 4.3 5.3 
8. Garlic 5.3 5.2 5.2 5.0 4.6 5.0 
9. Ginger 2.25 1.7 1.7 2.1 2.4 2.2 (1.5) 
10. Jack fruit 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.3 
11. Mangoes 2.8 2.6 2.6 2.5 2.6 2.8 
12. Okra 2.5 2.8 3.8 4.4 4.4 3.8 
13. Pepper 4.2 4.3 4.3 4.1 4.3 
14. Passion fruit 2.8 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.1 4.0 
15. Pawpaws 3.4 3.1 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.1 
16. Pineapples 0.8 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.7 1.8 (1.4) 
17. Sweet potatoes 0.8 1.2 1.3 1.2 1.1 1.0 
18. Turmeric 2.1 2.1 2.0 2.1 2.3 1.0 (1.8) 
19. Cucumbers 
Note: According to one exporter, 'Please note that the above figures seem to be 
inflated. They appear to be retail prices'. This view is widely shared by other exporters. 
These are the best prices for high quality produce at peak seasons. Uganda receives 
much lower prices, see Section VII. 
Source: Uganda Advisory Board of Trade and Uganda Export Promotion Council, 
Ministry of Commerce, 1989. 
The data indicates that in general, the price elasticities of demand are higher 
for processed than for non-processed commodities. This suggests that the stiff 
competition in the international market Uganda will face will increase with the 
degree of processing. 
In theory, Uganda as a small exporter can consider the demand for her 
commodities abroad as infinitely elastic. However, at the disaggregated level, 
her own supply of say a particular fruit, during off-season, can influence the 
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market price. For this reason, it is relevant to investigate the price-elasticity of 
demand. 
With the exception of roots and tubers (row lb, Table 14) income 
elasticities of demand also increase with the degree of processing. If Uganda 
wants a growing market for exports, not only must it open trade with countries 
of rising incomes, but it must also deliver sophisticated processed products to 
compete in these markets. 
From the list of current exports in Table 8, Uganda can consider the 
development of exports of processed wood products (eg, plywood), cotton 
products (lint, safari suits), leather and footwear. 
Turning to Table 15, the relevant categories for rough comparison would 
be entries (1), (3), (4) and (6). All these entries are high income-elastic. 
Table 14 Market prospects: income and price elasticities of 
demand for horticultural exports to European markets, 
1989 
Commodity group Price elasticity Income elasticity 
1 a Roots and tubers, fresh 
Fresh roots and tubers 
Miscellaneous vegetables 
1b Processed 
Roots and tubers 
Pulses 
Miscellaneous vegetables 
2a Fruits, unprocessed and fresh 
Bananas 
Oranges 
Tropicao fruits, other 
Tree-nuts 
2b Processed 
Tropical juices 
Other tropical fruits 
. Tree-nuts 
-0.50 
-0.52 
0.98 
0.89 
-1.00 
-0.30 
-1.29 
-2.09 
0.75 
3.34 
-1.60 
-0.60 
-1.04 
-1.78 
0.67 
0.90 
0.38 
0.17 
-2.24 
-1.50 
-0.54 
2.09 
1.39 
0.79 
Source: Nurul, 1989. 
15 Selected industrial countries: import demand 
Commodity United States Commodity Federal Republic of Germany 
(Kreinin) (non-EEC imports)(Glismann) 
Price Income 
1. Cotton products -1.17 1.37 Clothing -0.751 3.50 
2. Man-made fibre, textile products -0.99 6.86 Textiles -0.441 1.49 
3 Leather -0.74 1.691 Leather goods -1.55 1.04 
4 Footware -0.791 3.98 Shoes -1.71 3.31 
5. Plywood -0.511 2.39 Plastic goods -1.19 5.01 
6. Electronics machinery and equipment -0.92 3.39 Music goods and toys 1.041 5.36 
7. House electronomic equipment -0.71 7.74 Electronics -0.85 3.18 
8. Photographic equipment -1.08 2.86 
Note:1 Indicates that elasticity is not significantly different from zero at the 10% level of significance. 
Source: Donges, G.B. and J. Riedel, cited in IMF, 1987. 
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Unlike income elasticities, in Table 15, except for cotton products and 
photographic equipment, the price-elasticities of demand are low, the absolute 
values are less than one. This might suggest less price competition. However, 
if Uganda is to enter the international market, she will have to offer attractive 
prices to overcome the barriers to entry. 
Identification of exports for development and diversification in 
the immediate future: the supply side 
Ideally, the commodities in Table 16 should all be ranked according to the 
Domestic Resource Cost index (DRC) and the index should then be compared 
to the equilibrium exchange rate. The commodities whose DRC is found to be 
lower than the equilibrium exchange rate would qualify to be developed for 
export (see Section III). Without the equilibrium exchange rate, the official rate 
was used. 
Such ranking appears in Table 16, column (1). Six non-traditional 
commodities passed the DRC test: cashew nuts, simsim, beans, bananas, ginger 
and pineapples, in May 1990 when the official exchange rate was 390Ug.Shs 
per US$. At the bottom of the table, only three of the traditional exports 
passed the DRC test: tobacco, tea and Arabic coffee. 
The ideal data 
Ideally, the DRC calculations should cover all commodities identified as 
potential exports in Table 8. Unfortunately, at the moment only 20 non-
traditional exports are covered. The DRC ratio provides an important data base 
which should be developed. 
The official exchange rate should be approximately equal to the equilibrium 
exchange rate for the economy to guard against misallocating resources. The 
programming approach is the best method to calculate the equilibrium 
exchange rate for the economy (as described in Section III). This data does not 
exist in Uganda either and needs to be developed immediately. 
Extensions of supply-side analysis 
A parallel market exchange rate was also used to provide cutoff points of 
which exports should be developed (assuming that it is closer to the 
equilibrium exchange rate). The parallel market rate was 670 Ug.Shs per US$ 
Table 16 Uganda's exports according to comparative advantage 
Commodity Domestic Break-even Official Parallel 
resource cost exchange rate exchange rate market 
Mar 90 May 90 Nov 90 May 90 Nov 90 Dec 90 May 90 Nov 90 Dec 90 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (S) (7) (8) (9) 
1. Cashew nuts 8.12 
2. Chillies 94 
3. Cabbage 123 
4. Simsim 311 
5. Beans 343 
6. Bananas 360 641 633 
7. Fish (SPP)' 563 397 
8. Ginger 385 698 629 
9. Pineapples 390 834 
10. Fish (SFTf 578 405 
11. Vegetab':es (fresh) 420 567 
12. Soyabeans 566 
13. Groundnuts 1240 
14. Maize 3153 
Comparison with traditional exports 
1. Tobacco 241.45 4. Coffee, robusta 506.60 
2. Tea 326.22 5. Cocoa 517.41 
3. Coffee, Arabic 349.69 6. Cotton 755.11 
Note: 1. SPP: smoked fillet of Nile Perch: 2. SPT: smoked fillet of Tilapia. 
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Table 18a Average exchange rates of foreign 
exchange bureaux (replacing the parallel 
market, 1990) Ug.Shs per US$ 
Buying Selling 
November 787 767 
December 749 788 
Source: Ministry of Planning, March 1990, Semi-structured interviews of exporters, October 
1989 and November 1990, and Research Department, Bank of Uganda. 
in May 1990. At this rate 12 non-traditional commodities became competitive 
in column (1), adding soybeans and fresh vegetable. Among the traditional 
export, Robusfa coffee and cocoa became competitive. 
Break-even exchange rates 
With the time and resources allocated to this paper, it was not possible to 
gather the detailed farming-system data needed to update the DRC of the 
commodities in column (1) or to extend the calculations to more commodities. 
Instead, in columns (2) and (3), we calculated exchange rates at which the 
exporters of the identified commodities break even. 
This method is simpler to update as well, and we updated the calculations 
in column (2), in November 1990; the new results are reported in column (3). 
Concentrating on column (3), four commodities are profitable at the official 
exchange rate and seven at the parallel market rate. The relevant exchange 
rates are in columns (5) and (7), as 510 and 670 Ug.Shs per US$. 
Sensitivity and usefulness of the data in Table 16 
First, the .DRC calculations should be immediately extended to more 
commodities. Second, the calculations should be periodically updated since 
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costs can change appreciably m response to shocks, for example, the Gulf 
crisis. For example, the costs for ginger and pineapples went up appreciably 
between May and November because these are heavy commodities grown by 
scattered producers with high transport costs. Third, the comparison of DRC 
ratios should be with the equilibrium exchange rate for the economy. 
•: inclusions: identified exports for immediate development to 
diversify the export'base 
On the demand criteria, horticulture as a group stands out with the best market 
prospects, plus cashew nuts and vanilla. This is a small range of commodities 
to constitute a new export base. The current exports earnings out of the 
identified exports above amounted to US$2.35 in 1988 and declined to 
US$1.50 million in 1989. These minus export values must be assisted to rise 
systematically. The policies needed to bring about these changes are examined 
in Sections VI and VII. 
Given the very small range of exports, Uganda has to reduce costs, increase 
productivity, and generally upgrade traditional exports for some time despite 
low market prospect, until higher value exports pick up. 
On the supply criteria, simsim, beans, fish and soybean qualify to be added 
to the non-traditional export list. However, available data on comparative 
advantage needs to be improved before it can provide reliable results to guide 
policies. The cost-structure of some of the commodities whose break-even 
exchange rates were calculated in column (3) of Table 16 will be discussed in 
Section VII to provide further guidance for policy. 
Processing was identified as most desirable: processed and manufactured 
goods had higher income and price elasticities of demand. On the supply i.e., 
processing adds value, lowers weight, and lengthens the shelf-life. The bulk of 
exports identified are raw-materials, however. The problems Uganda faces in 
developing processing capacity will further be discussed in Section VII. 
VI A review of policies for export 
development and diversification, 1981-90 
This section reviews the policies instituted by government for export 
development and diversification to identify why these policies have failed to 
make a substantial difference in the trade statistics, and to suggest desirable 
changes. 
Exchange rate policy 
The major policy instrument has ben exchange rate adjustment, in a number 
of variants. The first was overall devaluation; the second was a dual exchange 
rate system Wl and W2 that gave a higher W2 rate to non-traditional exports; 
the third variant was to give a higher implicit exchange rate to exporters in the 
Dual Licensing Scheme than was possible by devaluation, as a transitional 
measure to complete exchange rate liberalisation. The fourth started in August 
1989 when the government adjusted the official exchange rate on the basis of 
net inflation against major trading partners. As the realised real effective 
exchange rate was found to be lower than that required to sustain investment 
in the coffee sector and at the same time, promote export diversification, it was 
decided in July that in addition, the exchange rate should be adjusted further 
from time to time to allow for a real devaluation of the Uganda shilling that 
would promote exports. 
Barter 
A second policy was to use barter trade to develop new markets, with the 
emphasis on barter to the PTA, for new commodities which would diversify 
the export base. 
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Retention scheme 
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The third policy was the foreign exchange retention scheme started in March 
1989. 
Exchange rate adjustment: variant I devaluation 
From June 1981 to August 1982 Uganda undertook a series of devaluations of 
the local currency in order to eliminate the implicit tax on exports from the 
over-valued currency of the 1970s. One major objective of devaluation was to 
pay higher prices in local currency to export producers, without printing 
money. A second perhaps more important objective was to raise government 
revenue from this non-inflationary source, so as reduce borrowing from the 
Central Bank. The nominal exchange rate figures between 1981 and 1985 are 
given in Table 17. 
Higher prices were to direct previously smuggled coffee into official 
channels, stimulate better husbandry of those coffee trees that survived the 
1970s, rehabilitate abandoned shambas (small farms), and revive the 
production of tea, tobacco and cotton. 
The response to devaluation was positive on coffee, as shown in Table 1 by 
the increase in the volume exported over the period 1982-1985. Diversion 
from smuggling increased the coffee volume in 1982 and 1983, while 
improved husbandry and rehabilitation of abandoned sambas sustained the 
higher volumes in 1984 and 1985. The volume changes moved from 128,000 
metric tons in 1981 to 175,000 in 1982, 144,000 in 1983, 133,000 in 1984 and 
151,000 in 1985. 
After 1984, revisions of producer prices lagged behind changes in the CPI 
thus wiping out the producer incentive. Although coffee continued to bring 
high earnings beyond 1985 because of good international prices, the earnings 
from cotton, tobacco and maize tapered off, as indicated in Table 1. 
The W2 dual exchange rate system and non-traditional 
exports: August 1982 to May 1984 
In August 1982 a second Window (Window 2) was opened for the purchase 
and sale of foreign exchange at the Bank of Uganda, at a rate determined at 
the weekly auction by private bids. The auction rate was above the official rate 
Window 1, and both rates gradually rose to approach the parallel market rate 
Table 17 Nominal exchange rate, 1981-84 (Ug.Shs per US$) 
1981 1982 1983 1984 
Official w , W2 w, W2 w, W2 
rate official auction official auction official auction 
January 0.076 0.860 1.070 2.350 2.41 2.99 
Februarh 0.078 0.860 0.020 2.300 2.53 3.03 
March 0.079 0.858 1.166 2.360 2.74 3.20 
April 0.080 0.859 1.197 2.680 2.92 3.18 
May 0.081 0.874 1.283 2.755 2.92 3.26 
June 0.186 0.942 1.388 2.900 3.071 
July 0.794 0.987 1.551 2.937 3.39 
August 0.817 0.992 3.00 1.665 2.936 3.74 
Spetember 0.805 0.991 3.00 1.763 2.710 4.0 
October 0.791 0.997 2.00 1.856 2.955 4.46 
November 0.783 1.017 2.52 2.067 3.260 5.47 
December 0.856 1.048 2.40 2.338 3.025 5.52 
Note: 1. From June 1984 when the exchange rates were unified budgetary discipline became less strict and 
inflation accelerated leading to rapid depreciated o f t h e nominal rate. 
Source: Ftepubic of Uganda, Background io the Budget 1989-90, July 1989, p. 147, Table 18. 
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by May 1984, when they were merged. The relevant nominal rates are given 
in Table 17. 
Those shipping non-traditional exports were allowed to convert their foreign 
exchange earnings at the higher Window 2 rate. 
A look at Table 1 in Section II over the period 1982-84, shows that the 
response to W2 in terms of foreign exchange earnings was meagre. Entries of 
rows 5, 6, 9 and 10 in Table 1 which were predominantly non-traditional 
exports, show a very weak response. 
Row 9 is large because it contains maize shipments to Tanzania which were 
to pay for its contribution to the war of 1978-79. Apart from maize, only hides 
and skins as a single item shows a response of US$3.18 million in 1983 and 
US$4.51 million in 1984 (see row 6 in Table 1). According to an informed 
analyst, the hides and skins 'were fairly active export products even before the 
introduction of the dual exchange system'. They were simply diverted from 
smuggling into official channels (Mahmood, 1983). 
The diversion from smuggling was further assisted because the higher 
government revenue from the foreign exchange earnings, converted after 
devaluation, were used to pay cash to the farmers on delivering the crop and 
thus partly solved the problem of crop-finance. A comment on W2 in Table 
17 in 1983, for example, points out that development policy changes should 
accompany exchange rate adjustment: 
In the context of Uganda, exchange rate policy by itself may not be 
sufficient to give a strong impetus to exports, it also seems essential to 
evolve and execute production specific projects in order to increase 
production and improve marketing system in general (Mahmood, 1983 
p.5). 
The dual licensing system: a variant of exchange rate 
adjustment No. Ill 
In mid-1988, a joint Agricultural non-Traditional Export Promdtion Programme 
between the USAID and the Government of Uganda was launched with three 
purposes: 
1. To simplify import-export procedures so as to divert previously smuggled 
trade into official channels; 
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Real producer prices (Ug.Shs per kg (old shs)) 
Effective date CPI Robusta Arabica Non-bugishu Seed 
of price increase coffee coffee- Arabica cotton 
bugishu 
Base 
09.05.81 100 20 37 32 15 
11.11.81 92 38 71 61 33 
07.05.82 111 45 84 73 36 
09.05.83 148 41 70 59 33 
01.07.83 153 52 91 77 39 
21.12.83 170 60 104 88 53 
10.06.84 181 72 130 100 70 
29.10.84 250 84 140 110 72 
24.06.85 502 54 84 72 12 
Source: Real Ug. Shs per kg were calculated by deflating the nominal producer prices 
annnounced by the Kampala cost of living index, low-income group 1981=100, using 
the rates of inflation for the corrresponding date, in column 1. 
2. To allow the exporter of non-traditional commodities to return foreign 
exchange in terms of imports of equal value by issuing them with a 'dual 
license' for exporting and importing. The measure was to partly prevent 
capital flight, and partly to offer an 'implicit higher exchange rate' to the 
exporter. Our estimates during fieldwork suggest that the 'implicit exchange 
rate' ranged between Ug.Shs 1,000 and 1,500 per US$. This compared very 
favourably with the official exchange rate in column (4) of Table 16 which 
was only 360 Ug.Shs, per US$ for May 1990. The 'implicit rate' also 
compared favourably with the open market Kibanda rate which varied 
between Ug.Shs 500 in December 1989 and Ug.Shs. 750 in November 1990 
per US$. 
3. The dual licensing scheme was made even more attractive by offering 
foreign exchange at the official rate under a trade promotion line of credit 
administered by the Bank of Uganda. The importer qualified to have access 
to this money by proving that the imports were required in the production 
of non-traditional exports, such as: improved seeds; high analysis fertilisers; 
steel for the local manufacture of hoes and pangs; raw jute to manufacture 
gunny sacks; export packaging materials and raw materials to manufacture 
them locally (USAID, 1988). 
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Table 19 shows the response of exports to the Dual Licensing scheme as 
reported by the Ministry of Commerce on the basis of the value of licenses 
issued. Despite the very high 'implicit rate', the response in terms of exports 
earnings is still undramatic. The Uganda response compares less favourably to 
the Export Retention Scheme of Tanzania from which the foreign exchange 
earnings in two years (1987 and 1988) were shown in Table 9 (and are 
reproduced at the bottom row of Table 19). 
The Tanzania Retention Scheme also allowed a high 'implicit' rate which 
exporters could earn by using 50% of their foreign exchange earnings to bring 
imports for sale at open market prices. The Tanzania response is 40% above 
that of Uganda for the comparable period of two years. The nominal exchange 
rates relevant in Tanzania over the period of the retention scheme are given in 
Table 20. The largest increase in exports in Table 19 was from hides again, 
just like in the case of W2. This is previously smuggled output diverted into 
official channels and not new output. 
The scheme has been criticised by exporters because the export-import cycle 
takes at least two to three months to sell off the imports before local cash can 
be acquired to finance the next round of exports. This cumbersome procedure 
cuts done turn-over. In addition, an efficient exporter needs not be an efficient 
importer and the scheme hampers specialisation. A more devastating criticism 
is that looking at the licenses issued neither assures you that exports were 
shipped non imports brought. For example: 
The figures for bananas were supposed to be exported by Foods and 
Beverages Ltd. but they were actually never exported (Kawanga, 1990, 
P-15). 
An accurate data base is required from customs data to monitor actual flows 
of exports and imports against the licenses issued by the Ministry of 
Commerce and the foreign exchange receipts registered by the Bank of 
Uganda. 
The foreign exchange retention account variant of exchange 
rate policy IV 
Whereas in the Dual Licensing System the exporter had to immediately spend 
his foreign exchange on imports to be returned, in March 1989 the 'Retention 
Account' was instituted to allow the exporter to 'retain' 100% foreign 
exchange earned at his/her commercial bank, and apply to use it at a later date 
of his/her choosing to import any commodity on the list approved by the Bank 
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Table 19 Exports under the Dual Licensing Scheme, 1988 to 
June 1990 (US$) 
Commodity 1988 1989 Jan-June 1990 
Bananas 285,671.14 90,822.97 43,010.00 
Bogoya 230,810.88 169,662.75 18,899.0 
Beans 726,288.80 2,894,193.73 5,175,622.40 
Maize 324,710.07 124,200.00 500,192.26 
Other cereals 662,142.50 2,548,676.34 0.00 
Ginger 478,079.53 261,531.98 198,113.88 
Pineapples 680,664.44 279,109.22 212,427.88 
Fruits 257,337.27 223,655.05 27,605.00 
Vegetables 449,585.85 349,716.67 0.00 
Teas 794,000.00 2,263,274.86 1,847,706.90 
Tobacco 89,704.00 39,711.00 9,169.00 
Other crops 69,855.46 862.88 0.00 
Timber 3,927,140.04 1,176,333.21 656,487.36 
Sale 80,632.00 135,708.33 27,760.00 
Hides 3,587,354.00 8,685,382.00 3,514,492.21 
Fish 474,591.50 1,822,638.82 880,444.63 
Other exports 148,918.19 278,654.00 0.00 
Simsim - - 7,038,997.80 
Soyabeans - - 25,000 
Sugarcase - - 3,850.00 
Cassava flour - - 16,300.00 
Cattle - - 175,000.00 
Cattlehorn tips - - 56,900.00 
Chillies - - 2,205.00 
Vanilla - - 20,415.00 
Flowers - - 29,850.00 
Ghee - - 4,000.00 
Groundnuts - - 4,000.00 
Goats - - 8,333.33 
Handicrafts - - 547,000.00 
Honey - - 8,324.02 
Melon - - 5,250.00 
Millet - - 2,519.00 
Mondarines - - 8,333.33 
Okra - - 2,519.00 
Oranges - - 2,519.00 
Papain - - 5,000.00 
Total 13,267,485.67 21,344,133.71 21,081,165.00 
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Notes: 1. Government barter protocols are excluded. These figures ar 
as per the licenses issued. 2. The most export commodities whose 
figures appear in only 1990, were summed up under 'other* for the 
years 1988,1980 when they were too small to be entered seperately. 
Source: Minsitry of Commerce, export licences issued, and Bank of 
Uganda, Research Department. 
Table 20 Tanzania: mean exchange rates since the inception of the Export Retention 
Scheme (nominal values, T.Shs per US$) 
Month 1986 1987 1988 1989 
January 53 
February 55 130 
March 57 134 
April 59 136 
May 62 137 
June 63 145 
July 65 145 
August 43 67 145 
September 44 70 145 
October 46 73 147 
November 49 76 155 
December 51 83 192 
Source: United Republic of Tanzania, National Bank of Commerce, March 1990. No 
figures were recorded for the dotted Months. 
of Uganda, or any other commodity required as an input to produce non-
traditional exports. 
The exporters interviewed stated that they could not trust the Bank of 
Uganda to allow them to use their foreign exchange if the bank had other 
pressing commitments. By April 1990, a year later, only 29 Retention 
Accounts had been opened (Kawanga, 1990). In Tanzania, which has only 50% 
retention, an exporter can cash part of his foreign exchange and use the 
proceeds for working capital. Apparently the sense of confidence in the scheme 
in Tanzania is greater than that in Uganda. 
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Forex bureau 
In July 1990, the government liberalised the foreign exchange market by 
authorising the purchase and sale of foreign currency limited to hard 
currencies, by licensed forex bureaux. A bureaux freely sets and displays the 
rates for foreign currencies. 
With the exception of the Coffee Marketing Board, all other exporters can 
freely exchange export proceeds at the bureaux rates. The main advantage to 
exporters is the ability to convert proceeds into Ug. Shs. at the high bureaux 
rate at free will. This enables them to specialize in export business. 
It is still too early to assess the impact of bureaux on export promotion and 
diversification. However, it is also doubtful whether the effect of this policy 
can be identified unless the system for tracking exports is improved. This 
subject is pursued by the authors in a subsequent study, 'Exchange Rate 
Unification and Economic Development', supported by the AERC. 
Barter trade, 1984-89 
Barter trade was started in 1984 and was given even greater emphasis by the 
current government in 1986-88. Government to private company barter deals 
cover a large number of countries outside the former Eastern European Bloc; 
for example, the USA, West Germany, and Italy. By June 1988 contract values 
stood at: government to government, exclusively with the Eastern Bloc, US$96 
million; government to private companies, US$111.1 million; and non-
government to private companies, US$21.0 million for non-traditional exports 
only (Bank of Uganda, 1987/88, and Ministry of Commerce, 1988). 
The primary objective of barter trade was to economize on payments with 
scarce foreign exchange. A second important objective was to increase and 
diversity exports as: 
1. There was a higher 'implicit exchange rate' for barter exporters; 
2. Barter opened up new markets for traditional exports: tea, tobacco, surplus 
coffee not sold to the quota markets and cotton; and 
3. New exports that were not entering the traditional markets could also enter 
barter., 
In category 3 the original emphasis was on grains: beans, groundnuts, maize, 
simsim, soyabeans, but later other non-traditional exports were also considered; 
cotton yarn, hides and skins, and timber. 
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Government to government contracts and government to private company 
contracts, were handled by parastatals; the Coffee Marketing Board (CMB) for 
coffee; the Lint Marketing Board (LMB) for cotton products; the Produce 
Marketing Board (PMB) for grains; Uganda Tea Authority for tea; Uganda 
Leather and Tanneries Industries (ULATI) for hides and skins; and Uganda 
Hardware for timber. 
Except for coffee, barter trade has been characterized by lack of internal 
marketing logistics including lack of gathering, sorting and grading places; 
general ignorance about local supply, quality and quantity and whether or not 
there was a surplus for export; plus lack of valuation procedures. The absence 
of these logistics left the bulk of barter deals to be filled with coffee 
shipments, contrary to the objectives of export diversification. By June 1988, 
around 73% of barter exports, equivalent to US$59.03 million was accounted 
for by coffee shipments. Also the inertia and inefficiency of parastatals led to 
liberalization to allow private companies to enter into deals with other private 
companies in non-traditional exports. 
By early 1989, the government began to realize that barter trade was not 
working well, and had turned out to be an inefficient diversion of attention 
from serious policies of export development. 
Regional trade and the PTA 
The preferential trade area (PTA) was one of the new markets in which to 
expand non-traditional exports, largely through barter, to economize on the use 
of hard currencies. Uganda signed the Treaty establishing the PTA in 
December 1981. Table 21 gives Uganda's trade flows to and from the PTA, 
and market share. 
The general marketing logistics that bedeviled barter are equally applicable 
to trade with the PTA, and have forced Uganda to settle balances in scarce 
foreign exchange since it could not raise exports. 
Uganda has been advised to settle marketing logistics, to establish bilateral 
commissions with individual countries in the PTA, and to negotiate improved 
access of Ugandan goods. This advice is in the light of the slow negotiations 
for payment clearance and reductions of both tariff and non-tariff barriers 
globally all over the PTA (Commonwealth Fund for Technical Cooperation, 
1989). 
Currently, the contribution of the PTA to Uganda's export expansion and 
diversification is minimal. Given her poor processing capacity, Uganda has a 
comparative disadvantage to export manufactures to the PTA. Therefore, 
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expansion of exports to the PTA will require adoption of development policies 
to restructure processing and manufacturing capacity. 
Other policies geared towards export development 
The government is becoming increasingly aware of the gravity of the problems 
facing the export sector and has announced a number of measures during 1990 
to further encourage non-traditional exports. These include: 
• The Bank of Uganda refinancing the commercial banks that lend to private 
buyers of export crops; 
• All officers handling potential exporters to be resident in the Ministry of 
Commerce as opposed to the previous situation where exporters had to clear 
with the Ministries of Commerce, Finance and the Bank of Uganda; 
• Exporters required to produce tax clearance only once in six months or even 
once in a full year, for those with a good record; 
• No export tax levied on exports except coffee; 
• Regular exporters to be permitted to operate forex accounts in commercial 
banks; 
• Exporters of manufactured goods to have sales tax and excise duty on the 
quantities of good exported refunded by the government; 
• Exporters of locally manufactured goods using local raw materials to further 
benefit from a reduction in corporation tax. 
Evaluation of policies, 1981-90 
The basic thrust during the period 1981-90, was exchange rate policy, in 
various forms, and the evaluation will concentrate on this policy. 
Overall devaluation 
The response of export producers, to higher prices in local currency made 
possible by devaluation, was positive. However, it was short-lived, and lasted 
only from 1981 to 1984, as illustrated in Table 1, especially coffee, cotton and 
total exports. 
Table 21 Uganda: intra-PTA trade and percentage share of the PTA market, 1982-88 (US$ million) 
Country Exports Imports 
1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 
Djibouti 6.80 10.00 8.20 6.10 14.40 19.10 20.70 50.30 39.00 39.90 16.60 18.00 21.60 25 90 
Comoros 0.00 0.30 0.40 0.40 0.50 1.30 0.40 4.70 2.80 5.40 4.20 3.90 5.10 5 50 
Burundi 0.99 2.57 6.15 7.41 6.63 3.23 4.15 25.13 14.41 20.34 18.17 18.39 21.75 23 11 
Mauritius 1.40 2.06 3.34 2.19 2.21 2.48 3.19 16.65 15.25 14.30 80.46 7.07 8.91 8 46 
Rwanda 2.12 0.68 3.25 3.71 4.37 119.11 90.10 77.15 62.41 69.83 40.51 40.53 47.72 45 82 
Tanzania 14.50 12.40 12.90 8.50 7.40 7.50 9.70 34.30 34.20 35.10 35.50 33.80 40.60 50 70 
Zambia 47.60 46.10 24.90 26.20 47.90 44.20 42.60 65.20 44.00 40.70 33.20 44.60 51.30 75 20 
Zimbabwe 63.60 55.40 58.30 66.50 61.80 83.60 102.80 49.00 33.10 32.70 26.50 33.80 31.80 36 50 
Uganda 2.96 5.96 13.45 3.98 4.09 4.71 5.86 111.83 116.10 108.03 112.64 112.09 141.41 169 49-
Somalia 0.64 0.43 5.03 0.32 1.06 1.12 1.39 39.61 10.67 15.30 13.01 18.05 22.64 27 18 
Malawi 17.77 20.14 22.16 21.91 11.47 12.14 17.69 25.76 31.88 29.42 22.97 16.67 24.75 35 38 
Ethiopia 38.60 32.53 30.37 13.02 14.17 16.75 19.91 7.44 9.65 7.07 5.89 11.83 12.21 14 48 
Kenya 203.60 188.30 185.90 179.00 183.20 222.40 256.10 35.50 16.20 16.03 15.80 22.00 154.50 125 70 
Total 402.60 375.87 374.35 339.24 359.19 537.64 574.59 542.47 429.67 434.39 355.45 390.73 584.29 643 42 
Market share (%) 0.74 1.58 3.59 1.17 1.14 0.88 1.02 20.61 27.02 24.87 31.69 31.25 24.20 26 34 
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Note: the data for Swaziland and Lesotho are not given separately. They are lumped together under South Africa and not shown here as South 
Africa is outside the PTA. 
Source: computed using data from International Monetary Fund Direction of Trade Statistics Yearbook 1989. 
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It is statistically impossible to isolate the effect of overall devaluation from 
that of other variants of exchange rate policy, such as W2 in Table 17, except 
for coffee which did not benefit from the higher exchange rates. If we 
concentrate on coffee, the higher rate of inflation eventually wiped out the 
increase in real producer prices, as illustrated in columns (3) and (4) of Table 
18. 
The conclusion on inflation is supported by Table 22 which shows that 
Uganda's determination to control money supply and the rate of inflation only 
becomes visible from mid-1989. This conclusion is also supported by the 
theory reviewed in Section III) which states that for exchange rate policy to 
work, it must be supported by consistent macroeconomic policies. 
Institutional reforms to support devaluation 
Although devaluation was unable to enlist a permanent increase in exports, 
some observers contend that the higher producer prices, devaluation made 
possible, diverted previously smuggled trade into official channels. This 
conclusion is debatable since smuggling in Uganda has continued to-date 
despite continuous devaluation. 
Others contend that in the 1982-84 period, the high coffee response was due 
to paying cash to coffee farmers on delivering the crop, rather than the high 
producer prices per se. If this is so, then devaluation which made the higher 
prices possible, needed reform of the marketing system as well to transmit the 
price incentive to the producers promptly. By tackling the problem of crop 
finance in the recent 1990 policy measures the government is moving in the 
right direction to make the devaluation tool more effective, and hopefully 
reduce smuggling as well. 
Simplifying export procedures should improve the transmission mechanism 
of whatever incentives are given by government to exporters. 
Caution on devaluation 
As the rate of inflation subsides, devaluation should be used more sparingly 
as it has other adverse consequences for the economy. For example, 
devaluation increases the cost of imports in local currency, including imported 
inputs. This aggravates the demand for working capital. 
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Table 22 Uganda: broad money and rates of inflation 
M2 (Ug.Shs Annual change 
billion) of new consumer price 
index, base Dec 1988=100 
(D (2) 
1984 1.2 159 
1987 18.54 132 
1988 39.19 159 
1989 
January 41.95 132 
February 45.92 117 
March 50.68 111 
April 54.64 107 
May 56.92 106 
June 60.17 106 
July 59.27 65 
August 51.80 47 
September 66.14 65 
October 666.95 77 
November 69.07 68 
December 79.10 67 
1990 
January 83.52 72 
February 88.61 65 
March 67.74 54 
April 88.20 41 
May 90.37 33 
June 94.43 26 
July 97.73 23 
August 101.15 26 
September 103.44 28 
October 107.32 29 
November 107.69 27 
December 112.02 25 
Source: Bank of Uganda, Research Department, May 1990. 
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The literature reviewed in Section III also argued that repeated devaluations 
which hide the underlying causes of disequilibrium erode confidence in the 
local currency. 
In Table 23, we present the official and parallel market exchange rates plus 
the real effective exchange rate. Taking March 1990 for example, the official 
exchange rate was Ug.Shs 379.00, while the real effective exchange rate was 
Ug.Shs 476.26. At that time the break-even exchange rate for coffee Robusta 
was Ug.Shs 506.60 per US$ (see Table 16). This reflects the high production 
cost in the coffee sector. Policies to lower costs and increase productivity 
should be used instead of devaluation to support high-cost production. 
Exchange rate unification and 'implicit exchange rates' 
Schemes like W2 in Table 17, dual licensing, barter trade etc, were used to 
offer a 'higher implicit rate' to exporters than the official rate. It appears that 
these higher exchange rates by themselves were not sufficient to stimulate 
exports and to diversify the export base. Responses from hides and skins, 
cotton, tea timber, horticulture, etc. are minute and intermittent in the official 
statistics. 
The multiplicity of 'higher implicit rates' can introduce new distortions in 
the economy: barter proved so inefficient that strong government backing 
gradually faded; dual licensing lowered turn-over and prevented specialization. 
The recent move to start the bureau-de-change and to narrow the gap 
between the bureau and the official rate appear to be in the right direction to 
unify the exchange rates. The policies in the 1990s should abandon 'implicit 
rates' and tackle the deep seated development problems directly: improve 
productivity; replace processing capacity to compete in the PTA; straighten out 
the marketing logistics to move food grains, for example beans, maize; provide 
crop finance; reform parastatals; and reduce costs. 
Export incentives of the 1990s 
The policies reviewed seem to centre around tax incentives to increase exports. 
The literature reviewed in Section III argues that such incentives need to be 
carefully designed to avoid encouraging high cost exports in which the country 
cannot develop comparative advantage. Such incentives have not proved 
successful in export development and diversification in the past 15 years. 
Finding a new tax base for Uganda is a real problem since the coffee export 
tax which used to provide over 50% of government recurrent revenue subsided 
with the fall in the international price of coffee. But the issue of a new tax 
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Table 23 Uganda: exchange rate developments, 1984-90 
71 
Year/ Nominal exchange Parallel market Real effective 
month rate(official) exchange rate exchange rate 
1984 3.0 5.83 5.83 
1987 60.0 169.41 97.50 
1988 106.0 414.00 207.44 
1989 
January 165.0 396.00 280.68 
February 165.0 406.00 308.10 
March 200.0 460.00 337.69 
April 200.0 520.00 355.90 
May 200.0 566.00 378.00 
June 200.0 612.00 400.12 
July 200.0 613.00 414.00 
August 200.0 592.00 423.52 
September 200.0 610.00 443.70 
October 340.0 633.00 462.33 
November 370.0 715.00 476.15 
December 370.0 751.00 479.06 
1990 
January 375.0 763.00 457.18 
February 379.0 716.00 459.26 
March 379.0 642.00 476.26 
April 379.0 644.00 480.46 
May 383.0 650.00 470.71 
June 397.0 657.00 480.32 
Source: calculated by author 
base should not be mixed up with export development: pressure groups might 
use the exports sector to avoid new taxes. In any event, a data base should be 
set up to evaluate the cost and benefit to the economy of this multiplicity of 
incentives. 
Conclusion 
After ten years of policies to encourage exports based on the exchange rate, 
Uganda is gradually liberalizing the market and controlling inflation to make 
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the exchange rate tool work. The country is also moving to unify the exchange 
rate. 
Having cleared the macro-economic background, the 1990s should 
concentrate on the specific development problems of the export sector: the 
most important of those as discussed in Section VII. 
VII Policy changes to remove persistent 
constraints to export development and 
diversification 
The state of the exports sector at the beginning of the 1990s 
It is fair to describe the state of Uganda's export sector as that of near-panic. 
While overall macro-policies are getting in place, as noted in Section VI, no 
consistent and significant response appears in the official export statistics. 
The country is getting deeper into debt: reliance on foreign loans and grants 
to finance imports is increasing while exports proceeds from coffee continue 
to decline (see Section I). The following quotation describes the state of panic: 
At all levels, from growers to overseas buyers, the current export trade 
is reactive, unplanned, and highly unstable. Cost-structures are 
artificial, technical support hardly exists, production is unpredictable, 
packaging unreliable, quality is minimal and marketing arrangements 
are geared to short-term benefits in a high risk environment. The result 
of this is the lack of confidence among growers, exporters, and buyers, 
which prevents long-term planning (Kawanga, April 1990, p.3.). 
The purpose of this section is to suggest some orderly approach to tackling the 
persistent constraints that the policies of Section VI have not been able to 
remove. 
Methodology 
In the process of collecting data (described in Section IV), we built a basic 
table, on eight specific exports categories; we then used the Table to rank the 
persistent constraints in order of relative importance which can be tackled by 
policy. 
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Data problem 
Before we even launch into Table 24, the first and most important problem is 
the uncertainty of existing official data on non-traditional exports, as 
documented in Section HI and summarized here for emphasis. 
Figures of licenses issued by the Ministry of Commerce do not tell whether 
exports actually left the country. 
Customs records would be the most reliable on trade flows: but customs 
posts must be specified, given the many panya roads at the borders. The 
exporters need to be assured that reporting to the customs department 
accurately will not result in penalty: confidence has to be built up to stop 
smuggling, which still continues. 
But even when customs data is in place, there are other relevant data to 
exports development and diversification: calculations of equilibrium exchange 
rates: farming systems data to calculate DRC ratios for agricultural crops; and 
extension of DRC ratio calculations to non-agricultural crops; f.o.b. prices; 
other prices on the international markets (which Kenya posts daily at the 
airport for horticultural crops to guide shipments, for example); information 
about competitors to identical exports markets etc. 
Policy makers must be convinced that they need the data to make intelligent 
decisions, and to monitor and evaluate policies: they should demand the data 
and stand ready to finance its collection or seek donor assistant to support the 
data base. 
It is also necessary to decide who collects which data, by what consistent 
methods and where it is to be reported and analyzed. Among the candidate 
institutions to consider are: Ministry of Finance (customs); Ministry of 
Commerce and Marketing (Export Promotion Council); Ministries of 
Agriculture, Industry; Bank of Uganda for macro-aggregates; Ministry of 
Planning and Economic Development, and Export Promotion and Analysis 
Development Unit (EPADU); Ministry of Tourism on information about 
tourists, earnings from tourism and supporting service industries; etc. 
Data bases also take time to build up. Meanwhile, informal research 
methods should be used to collect some minimum working numbers such as 
those in Table 24 to guide policy on the constraints we now proceed to 
discuss. 
Table 24 Cost for development exports, showing the relative importance of the constraints (cost items 1-8) and how they relate to 
exchange rate policy in late 1990 (November) 
Cost items 1 
Pineapples 
5 tons 
2 
Bananas 
1 ton 
3 
Ginger 
5 tons 
4 
Vegetables 
2 tons 
5 
Cabbage 
170 tons 
6 
Chillies 
25 tons 
7 
Fish (SFT) 
1kg 
8 
Fish (SFP) 
1kg 
1. Labour costs on the farm 40,678.00 12,930.00 86,178.45 12,930.00 100,000.00 100,000.00 1,915.00 1,915.00 
2. Entebbe charges 21,600.00 4,320.00 21,600.00 8,600.00 734,400.00 108,000.00 30.00 30.00 
3. Fixed costs 97,298.00 97,398.00 97,298.00 97,298.00 97,298.00 97,298.00 
4. Inland transport 50,000.00 40,000.00 40,000.00 50,000.00 1,700,000.00 200,000.00 20.00 20.00 
5. Produce 259,601.00 129,162.00 317,126.00 203,940.00 614,350.00 412,700.00 250.00 180.00 
6. Boxes for packing 361,974.42 61,578.49 291,493.82 246,313.95 9,910,762.00 2,990,000.00 
7. 20% wage to the exporter 166,230.28 69,057.70 172,739.23 121,824.40 2,631,362.00 781,599.60 
8. Freight 2,422,500.00 484,500.00 2 ,422,500.00 969,000.00 fob fob fob fob 
9. Total 3,419,881.70 898,846.19 3 ,458,936.20 1,699,946.3515,788,172.00 4,689,597.60 3,015.00 2,945.00 
10. Price per kg cif 0.82 1.42 1.10 1.50 (0.75) (2.00) (7.44) (6.66) 
11. Total value (US$) 4,100.00 1,420.00 5,500.00 3,000.00 127,500.00 50,000.00 7.44 6.66 
12. Break even exchange rate 834.00 632.00 628.90 565.65 510.00 93.79 405.00 397.00 
(Ug.Shs per US$) 
13. Official exchange rate 510.00 510.00 510.00 510.00 123.83 510.00 510.00 510.00 
14. Parallel market (bureau) 750.00 750.00 750.00 750.00 750.00 750.00 750.00 750.00 
exchange rate 
Notes: SFT = smoked fillet of Tilapia; SFP = smoked fillet of Nile perch, fob means that the commodity is free on board at Entebbe airport to 
be transported by the importer whose charges we do not know. 
Source: The cost of developing exports is calculated from semi-structured interviews of exporters, October 1989 and November 1990. 
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Freight charges 
Uganda is a land-locked country with access to external markets possible 
through Kenya and Tanzania or by air. From interviews of exporters of 
pineapples, bananas, ginger and vegetables to European markets by air, freight 
costs were estimated to account for 24-26% of the total c.i.f. value of a 
product. Table 24, row 8 containing the largest cost items, illustrates this 
problem. 
Similar conclusions were derived on surface transport to Mombasa of the 
five grains: bans, maize, groundnuts, soybeans and simsim where 'transport 
costs were 30-47% of total export costs' (Agricultural Non-traditional Export 
Promotion Programme (1988) Annex C.P.3.). Therefore, freight is the second 
most binding constraint, after lack of data. 
Immediate measures: surface transport 
Informal research should immediately be undertaken to investigate the best 
methods to reduce the transportation costs of existing exports: what 
combinations of rail, track and water transport would reduce land transport to 
the sea, for example, and which products ought to be taken by these 
combinations and in what minimum optimum tonnages? For example, the 
newly opened Kampala to Port Bell route which loads wagons to a ferry to 
Kisumu, then back on rail to Mombasa, is a case to consider. A similar 
arrangement from Jinja combining rail and water to Mombasa saved Uganda 
US$20 million in 1991, equivalent to her earnings from non-traditional 
exports! 
What is the most efficient way to collect and load the minimum-optimum 
tonnages from the current small-scale producers? Should such produce be 
collected by parastatals or the private sector? 
Is there a case for government intervention to reserve fuel for exporters to 
ensure regular shipments of optimal tonnages? How should surface transport 
policies harmonize with Government's effort to rehabilitate the infrastructure? 
Should Uganda ask customers abroad to collect some commodities f.o.b., as 
is the case with cabbages, chillies, and fish, until she develops better transport. 
The break-even exchange rates are much lower for sales f.o.b. (see Table 24, 
columns 5-8). 
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Immediate measures: air transport 
The exporters interviewed complained of the unreliability of Uganda Airlines, 
the national carrier. Scheduled flights are cancelled or delayed without prior 
warning causing losses to exporters of perishables. A revitalized Uganda 
Airlines, plus the likely increase in international flights in and out of Entebbe 
airport, with reliable schedules, should be negotiated for exporters by the 
government. 
The transport costs problem: long-term measures 
Uganda needs to consider developing qualitatively different exports from the 
current low priced and non processed exports. New exports should be of low-
weight, and high value, to economize on transport. Horticultural products with 
high value need processing, dehydration, canning, etc. to reduce weight. 
Processing will also enable Uganda to build up capacity for product 
differentiation, and to lengthen the shelf-life of the output. This would make 
the export sector more flexible, and the exports would move into the categories 
with higher income and prices elasticities of demand (indicated in Section HI 
and V). 
Collection and storage facilities 
Improving storage and collection facilities should be seen as a complementary 
measure to reduce transport costs. In order to move a minimum optimum 
tonnage, there is a need for collection and storage facilities from which to load 
such a tonnage. 
There is a general lack of collection and storage facilities for non-traditional 
exports, especially perishables. There is need for cold storage facilities in the 
producing areas and at the airport plus refrigerated trucks. In the event that a 
flight is delayed or cancelled, exporters need adequate facilities for cold 
storage at the airport. The cold room at the airport, with a maximum capacity 
of 25 tons and no specialized chambers for different qualities of produce, 
needs to be expanded and improved. 
The exporters told us during the field exercise that there is a general need 
for collection centres in the rural areas as well so that exporters buying 
produce from many small scale producers can minimize collection costs. Inland 
transport was estimated to account for between 10-17% of the f.o.b. price. 
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The exporters also need central places where produce can be prepared for 
export. Most of the exporters end-up using their residential places for sorting 
and packaging, or open areas near the airport, which results in poor sorting and 
packing of export produce. 
There is an established parastatal body, the Produce Marketing Board, 
charged with the marketing of grains. However, the board's storage and crop 
finance facilities are highly inadequate. In 1989, Uganda had a bumper crop 
of maize. The board failed to buy the farmers' produce resulting in heavy 
losses to the farmers. Most of the maize was sold at low prices to private 
buyers as the farmers themselves lacked storage facilities. 
The government should either construct directly the storage facilities or 
allow exporters/private companies to construct the facilities. An appropriate fee 
should then be charged to users. Inland restrictions on the movement of goods 
should be removed to allow for the optimum use of transport and storage 
facilities. 
Marketing 
Most of the exporters interviewed sell produce through marketing agents 
abroad. The agents offer very low prices to exporters compared to the 
international prices quoted. Table 25 shows that Uganda exporters are offered 
prices much lower than those paid to competitors. 
It may be that the quality of Uganda exports in poor: but then the other 
exporters indicated in Table 25 do not offer the best quality either. It is more 
likely that the importers take advantage of the ignorance of Ugandan exporters. 
There is, therefore, need for market information on a daily basis. The export 
promotion council and EPADU should advise exporters on market prospects 
before shipment. Exporters should also be trained to bargain for the best 
prices. There is thus need for an aggressive approach in marketing if Uganda 
is to enjoy higher international prices such as the average prices shown in 
Table 26. 
Packaging 
Packaging should complement the marketing effort by improving presentation 
and differentiation of the offers. The package by itself can make a difference 
to the price offered for the same contents. 
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Table 25 Horticulture: price comparisons in Djibouti 1990 
Commodity Offered price Market price Supplier Quality compared 
in Uganda by in Djibouti country with Uganda 
NCC (US$ per kg) (US$ per kg) products 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Pineapples 0.90 1.60 Kenya good 
Tomatoes 0.80 1.65 Kenya/Ethiopia good 
Bananas 0.80 1.75 Somalia poor 
Avacados 1.00 1.95 Kenya/Somalia very poor 
Capsicum 1.00 1.75 Kenya good 
Manoes 0.80 1.67 Kenya/Somalia very poor 
French beans 1.00 1.61 Kenya poor 
Pawpaw 1.20 1.67 Kenya/Somalia poor 
Oranges 1.21 1.60 Ethiopia fairly good 
Source: Market survey made in Djibouti by H. Kiryewala Mubirun of the Uganda 
Exporters Association, 1990. 
Packaging materials available on the local market currently are poor and very 
expensive. For most of the export products analyzed, packaging accounted for 
about 20% of the f.o.b. value. One exporter informed us that the boxes used 
in packing tend to get torn and spoil the quality of produce. 
Credit facilities and crop-finance 
There is a general lack of credit for the agricultural sector. Due to the poor 
performance of loans to farmers and co-operative societies, there are few banks 
willing to extend credit for financing produce. The current interest rates are 
prohibitive to borrowing for purchase of produce as margins in the export 
business for small operators are minimal. But then exporters with limited 
working capital cannot expand their small consignments nor reduce operating 
costs. 
Table 26 Average wholesale price of selected commodities, 1984-90 (US$ per kg, cif European port) 
1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 July Aug Average 
1990 1990 price 
Groundnuts 0.43 0.40 0.42 0.30 0.41 - 0.39 - 0.39 
Honey 0.90 1.00 1.02 1.00 1.04 - 0.99 - 0.99 
Sorghum 0.11 0.14 0.12 0.22 0.20 - 0.12 0.24 0.16 
Ginger 2.24 1.70 1.70 2.10 2.40 2.75 2.20 2.40 2.19 
Chillies 3.40 4.35 4.28 3.80 4.30 3.61 3.92 3.20 3.86 
Maize 0.09 0.10 0.11 0.10 0.13 - 0.11 - 0.11 
French beans 2.35 2.80 2.65 2.85 2.89 - 2.90 3.40 2.81 
Soyabeans 0.20 0.30 0.32 0.30 0.43 - 0.36 - 0.32 
Sesema seeds 0.28 0.32 0.33 0.30 0.38 - 0.32 - 0.32 
Millet 0.08 0.35 0.30 0.32 0.38 - 0.28 0.25 0.28 
Peas (cow) 0.45 0.35 0.38 0.35 0.36 -
Passion fruits 2.80 3.04 3.00 3.02 3.10 3.91 3.20 3.20 3.16 
Papaya 3.40 3.14 3.00 3.00 2.20 2.84 3.10 - 3.05 
Pineapples 0.84 1.45 1.42 1.41 1.70 1.70 1.45 1.60 1.45 
Avadados 1.40 2.48 2.43 2.43 2.48 2.07 2.40 3.80 2.44 
Mangos 2.80 2.54 2.58 2.52 2.60 2.05 2.55 3.00 2.59 
Okra 2.50 2.80 3.84 4.36 4.42 3.98 3.72 4.50 3.77 
Turmeric 2.04 2.10 2.00 2.10 2.25 - 2.20 - 2.12 
cont... 
Table 26 cont... 
1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 July Aug Average. 
1990 1990 price 
Dry cassava 0.43 0.35 0.38 
Sunflower 0.40 0.30 0.32 
Garlic 5.30 5.20 5.20 
Sweet potatoes 0.82 1.21 1.20 
Aubergine 1.20 1.22 1.24 
Vanilla 0.55 0.60 0.60 
Bananas (bogoya) 3.63 3.53 3.20 
Beans (s/colour) 0.55 0.58 0.56 
Simsim 0.80 0.83 0.87 
Bananas 2.00 2.08 2.10 
Jack fruit 1.30 1.32 1.28 
Bees wax 3.30 3.10 3.40 
Melons 1.50 - -
Guavas 
Plantains 
Yams 
Lime 
Asparagus 
0.35 0.32 - 0.27 - 0.35 
0.35 0.32 - 0.35 - 0.34 
5.00 4.60 - 4.06 - 4.34 
1.20 1.13 1.51 1.20 - 1.38 
1.20 1.34 - 1.24 - 1.24 
0.55 0.62 - 0.50 - 0.57 
2.90 2.87 3.20 3.24 1.60 3.03 
0.59 - - 0.58 - 0.58 
0.86 0.60 - 0.85 0.66 0.82 
2.20 0.90 - 2.11 3.00 2.23 
1.32 2.15 - 1.32 - 1.31 
3.50 1.30 - 3.38 - 3.36 
- 3.50 1.51 1.50 2.20 1.68 
- 3.67 3.67 3.50 3.61 
- - 1.75 1.75 - 1.75 
- 1.95 - - 1.95 
- - 2.40 - - 2.40 
- - 4.36 4.35 - 4.36 
Notes: The prices above are the prices offered to commodities from East Africa. The above prices are just average wholesale prices. 
Source: Uganda Export Promotion Council. 
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Measures to improve production 
Packages of incentives are desirable to encourage an increase in the production 
of exports. But our general view, and that in the literature, is that such 
incentives should be carefully designed according to dynamic comparative 
advantage. Data is needed to calculate costs and benefits of these incentives: 
they should not be rushed into. 
Ugandans are high cost-producers and the exchange rate required to make 
exports viable, in Table 24 is very high. Measures to increase productivity and 
reduce costs, therefore, need to be carefully designed. 
Footnotes 
1. Excellent reviews of the economic policies of this period are given by 
Commonwealth Secretariat (1979); International Development Research 
Centre (IDRC) (1987); International Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development, Industrial Development and Finance Division, Eastern and 
Southern African Project Department (1986). Although the 1970s are 
usually blamed for all the economic decline, the process started in 1968 
when measures to nationalize the commanding heights of the economy 
began. See Obote (1970). 
2. In a more recent survey of 60 enterprises, including parastatals, the 
shortage of working capital persists. Only two enterprises did not cite 
working capital as a serious constraint: these two are either supported by 
external credit (Uganda Posts and Telecommunications) or outright donor 
grant (The Dairy Corporation). Republic of Uganda and the World Bank, 
Financial Sector Study Kampala, Development Consultants International, 
27 April 1990. 
3. Uganda in particular, and Africa in general, are being displaced by new 
LDC competitors in the international market, especially from Asia. 
Africa's share, even in those commodities in which she had comparative 
advantages in the 1960s is declining. Svedberg, P., 1987, The Export 
Performance of Sub-Saharan Africa, World Institute of Economic 
Research, United Nations University, Helsinki, Finland. 
4. A general case for exports diversification could not be made from the 
studies on cyclical fluctuations because the instability in earnings 
depended on the income and price elasticities of demand, and the price 
elasticities of supply, of the specific commodity. Earnings from coffee, 
rubber, and cocoa, for example, were more unstable than those from 
petroleum, bananas, sugar and tobacco. 
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Second, the foreign trade multiplier which forms the transmission 
mechanism of instability in exports earnings to the domestic economy, 
was found to be small. 
5. The different forms of non-tariff barriers are documented in Salvatore 
(1983) and IMF (1987b). The non-tariff barriers faced by horticultural 
exports to the EEC are discussed by Islam (1989) 
6. Equation (6) assumes that ey and ep are already estimated in the usual 
way using the first and second terms in equation (2). 
7. A definition of 'growth elasticities' is given by Chenery, H.B., 1960, 
'Patterns of Industrial Growth', American Economics Review vol. 50. The 
growth elasticity is a product term. The income-elasticity of demand 
depends on the shape of the Engle curve while the annual rate of increase 
in income determines the speed at which the Engle curve is shifting out 
to the right. Similarly, the price elasticity of excess demand depends on 
the shape of the excess demand curve while the annual rate of change of 
the relative price determines the speed at which the excess demand curve 
shifts out to the right. 
8. An illustration of how to derive the supply function similar to that in 
Equation (8) from the constant — elasticity of substitutions production 
function, is given in Ssemogerere, G. (1990) Structural Adjustment 
Programmes and the Coffee Sector in Uganda, 1981-1987 African 
Economic Research Consortium working paper, Nairobi, Kenya, 
Appendices B and D. 
9. There is a reaction in the literature against large models which 
complicate computation, yet yield results from which it is difficult to 
interpret causality. See Stern, 1989 and Weiss, 1990, 'Theoretical 
Foundations of Development Planning under Changing Global Economic 
conditions', Economics, Vol. 41. 
10. The literature on multinationals in UNCTC (1990) articulates this point 
as what really matters for the political environment to attract investment, 
both local and foreign. 
11. See IMF (1987b). The importance of maintaining flexibility to adjust to 
whatever external shocks and internal problems that might arise is again 
stressed by Weiss (1990). 
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12. The , problems of reducing regional economic restrictions were already 
demonstrated when the East African Community broke up in 1974, as 
indicated in Section II. The same difficulties are holding up trade 
liberalization in the PTA. 
13. Such examples are cited in the literature, especially Schapiro (1986) in 
the cases of Kenya where Exporter Associations, both large-scale and 
small-scale for outgrowers, have worked closely with government to 
continuously educate exporters. The Uganda Manufactures Associations, 
the Chamber of Commerce, and the Horticultural Growers and Exporters 
Associations, should be encouraged to overcome their internal 
organizational problems so that they can also educate exporters. 
14. A bleak assessment of the prospects for direct foreign investment into 
African in the 1990s, and some practical policy suggestions, is given by 
Cockcraft and Riddell (1990). 
15. Such haphazard incentives are cautioned against in the literature, for 
example Schapiro (1986) and UNCTC (1990). New programmes on 
capacity building, and assistance on multinationals, cited in UNCTC 
(1990) should be utilized by Uganda to carefully put together her export 
development programme, identify bottlenecks that need foreign 
investment and use the United nations machinery to attract such 
investment. 
16. The literature on aid shows that its value over the last 15 years has been 
greatly reduced because of tying. See Stern (1989). 
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